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Norman Siebrasse* The Choice Between Implied
Warranty and Tort Liability for
Recovery of Pure Economic
Loss in "Contract-Torts":
A Comparison of Judicial and
Private Ordering in the Real
Property Market
The Supreme Court's decision in Winnipeg Condo. Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construc-
tion expanded recovery for pure economic loss in tort by allowing a subsequent
purchaser to recover the cost of repairing a dangerous defect arising out of
negligence in the construction of a building. This article outlines the theoretical
justifications for extended tort liability when the parties are linked by a contractual
chain but are not in privity, and concludes that it is not possible to determine
whether extended liability is desirable without considering the details of the
market in question. A comparison between tort liability and the protection afforded
by the warranties offered by the New Home Warranty Corporations across the
country indicates that the private warranties offer a better trade-off between
protection and cost than does tort liability. The article further argues that while the
builder's liability should be extended, it should be accomplished through a
contractually implied third-party beneficiary warranty of fitness for habitation
rather than through expansion of tort recovery for pure economic loss. Among
other factors, the article considers the view that indeterminacy of recovery
militates against expanded tort recovery and argues that indeterminacy per se is
not as important as increased litigation and transaction costs that accompany
expanded tort recovery.
Parsa ddcision dans 'arrt Winnipeg Condo Corp. No. 36 c. Bird Construction,
la Cour Supreme du Canada a 61argi le droit au recouvrement pour perte
purement 6conomique en mati&re de responsabilit6 civile en permettant au tiers
acqu6reur d'un ddifice de r6cup6rer le coot des r6parations pour un vice de
construction dangeureux r6sultant de n6gligence. Cet article donne un aperqu
* Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton. This is a revised version of a
paper presented at the 26th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, held at the
University of Toronto on October 18 and 19, 1996. Comments from the participants of the
Workshop are gratefully acknowledged. Representatives of the New Home Warranty Pro-
grams/Corporations from across the country were most helpful in explaining to me the
workings of the Programs. I owe a particular debt to Michael Hall, Deputy Chief Executive of
the English National House Building Council for sharing with me some of his encyclopaedic
knowledge of the home warranty programs in both England and North America. Our
discussions of the actuarial and insurance aspects of the industry in particular were invaluable,
although any shortcomings on these points in the article are of course my responsibility. I would
also like to thank Vaughan Black, Bruce Feldthusen and Ed Veitch for useful comments on
earlier drafts.
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sur les justifications theoriques i l'appui d'un 6largissement du droit au
recouvrement en matiere d6lictuelle quand les parties en cause n'ontpas de liens
contractuels et affirme qu'il taut consid6rer les conditions du march6 en question
pour doterminer si un tel 6largissement est souhaitable ou non. Consid6rant les
garanties offertes par les "New Home Warranty Corporations" dans I'ensemble
du pays, a la lumi6re d'une analyse portant sur les coots et les avantages,
l'indemnit6 en matibre dolictuelle semble offrir une protection moins avantageuse
que celle offerte par ces garanties. Cet article soutient le raisonnement selon
lequel la responsabilit6 du constructeur devrait 6tre 6largie par le biais d'une
garantie contractuelle implicite en faveur du tiers acqu6reur garantissant
l'habitabilit6 de 1'6difice plut6t qu'en permettant un recouvrement en matibre
d61ictuelle pour perte purement 6conomique. Entre autres, cet article prend en
considdration le raisonnement selon lequel *'ind6termination du coot de
recouvrement milite contre I'dlargissement du droit au recouvrement en mati6re
d6lictuelle et affirme que les coots du litige et de transaction militent d'avantage
contre un tel 61argissement que cet 616ment d'inddtermination.
Introduction
In C.N.R. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co.1 the Supreme Court of Canada
made clear that there is no per se rule against recovery of pure economic
loss in tort and stated that the development of the law in this area should
proceed incrementally on the basis of sound policy considerations.2 The
unanimous decision of the Court in Winnipeg Condo. Corp. No. 36 v.
Bird Construction3 is a further step in this cautious evolutionary process.
In Bird the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a tort action against a
building contractor by a party not in contractual privity with the contrac-
tor (namely, a subsequent purchaser of the building) for recovery of the
cost of repairing defects arising out of negligence in the construction of
a building which posed a real and substantial danger to inhabitants of the
building or passers-by. While the holding likely extends to chattels as
well as real property and to all financial loss rather than the cost of repairs
to the building, it was clearly and deliberately confined to economic loss
resulting from dangerous defects. But in keeping with its recognition that
the law in the area is evolving, the Court also indicated a willingness to
consider the possibility of extending the builder's liability to losses
resulting from non-dangerous defects.4 Although doctrinally a short step
from the holding in Bird, in practice such an extension of liability would
be revolutionary. It seems we are a short step away from general recovery
in tort of all economic loss resulting from defective goods of any kind.
1. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021.
2. Ibid. per McLachlin J. at 1139-40, per La Forest J. at 1048-49.
3. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85; 3 W.W.R. 85; 23 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 [hereinafter Bird cited to S.C.R.].
4. Ibid. at 119.
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This article takes up the Court's implicit invitation to comment on the
possible extension of tort recovery to non-dangerous defects. I argue that
while a good case can be made for extending liability, it should be done
in contract by means of an implied warranty of fitness for habitation in the
sale of structures which will benefit third parties, in particular subsequent
purchasers,5 rather than through expansion of tort recovery for pure
economic loss. The argument applies equally to dangerous defects, but I
focus on non-dangerous defects because the issue with respect to danger-
ous defects has been settled by the Court's decision in Bird.
The basic point is not a novel one: recovery of pure economic loss in
tort is dangerous because it fails to recognize the role of contract in
allowing the parties to allocate risks between them more appropriately
than can be done by the courts and tort law. We should not be misled into
a pure tort analysis by the formal fact that there was no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and defendant in Bird. Despite the lack of a direct
contractual link, the relationship between the parties was nonetheless
sufficiently close that indirect contracting was possible: if a warranty
from the builder is desirable, the original owner would have an incentive
to purchase the warranty from the builder which would run to subsequent
purchasers, and then resell the building at a higher price to reflect the
warranty protection. This possibility is not an economist's fancy, but
rather, as we shall see, it is the norm in residential real estate transactions.
Surely the sophisticated parties to a commercial real estate transaction
could do as well.
This is not to make the argument that the courts should not intervene
because parties will necessarily arrive at optimal contractual arrange-
ments if left to their own devices. On the contrary, I will argue that there
are good reasons to believe that there will be failures in the bargaining
process. Rather, I am arguing that we cannot assume that contracting will
break down entirely simply because the parties are not directly in privity.
While there will be failures in the bargaining process in this context (as
in any other context), indirect contracting is at least potentially feasible.
And even though contracting is imperfect, judicial imposition of tort
liability is also an imperfect solution to the risk allocation problem. An
analysis based on purely formal considerations will be inadequate. What
is required is a specific comparative analysis of judicial and contractual
risk allocation. In other words, Bird Construction is as much about
5. This is the dominant American approach: see W.K. Jones, "Economic Losses Caused by
Construction Deficiencies: The Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort" (1991) 59 U. Cinn.
L. Rev. 1051 for an excellent and comprehensive review of the American law.
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concurrency of tort and contract actions as it is about recovery of pure
economic loss in tort.
Unfortunately, but understandably, the development of concurrency
has been driven by the use of tort law and, to a lesser extent, the law of
fiduciary obligations, to remedy perceived inequities in contract law.6
This path of development is understandable, since cases are driven by the
clients' needs rather than by a desire for conceptual coherence, and there
is no incentive to frame a cause of action in novel terms unless there is
some gain to be had thereby. But it is also unfortunate because concurrency
is a blunt instrument. Tort-contract concurrency introduces all aspects of
tort law to the contractual scene, not just those which remedy the
perceived problem at hand. It is not a foregone conclusion that because
the tort rule on limitations appears to be better the tort rule on damages
is also to be preferred. If the law is to be rationalized the Court needs to
examine each substantive difference between tort and contract individu-
ally and determine which rule is to be preferred, or the unintended
consequences of concurrency may prove a cure worse than the disease.
The decision in Bird is a classic example of using tort law to dodge
contract law. The inconvenient aspect of contract law which Bird attacks
is the doctrine of caveat emptor in new home sales. In Fraser-Reid v.
Droumsetkas7 the Court bemoaned the irrationality of the rule of caveat
emptor, but affirmed it nonetheless, saying it was too firmly entrenched
to be changed judicially. It appears that the Court is no longer convinced
by its own argument. Bird has taken the first step in making an end-run
via tort law, and if the result is extended to non-dangerous defects,
6. In Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Central
Trust] a leading case in the development of concurrent actions, the reason the plaintiff sought
(and was permitted) to bring an action in tort was in order to take advantage of a more generous
rule on the running of the limitations period in tort. In Dominion Chain Co. v. Eastern
Construction Co. (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.), aff'g sub nom. Giffels Associates v.
Eastern Construction Co. (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 344 concurrent actions in tort and contract
were allowed in order to permit contribution between parties in breach of their duty in a
contractual setting. (Contribution was denied on the facts because one of the joint tortfeasors
was protected from liability to the plaintiff by a waiver of liability clause in its contract.)
Negligent misrepresentation serves as a means of avoiding the parol evidence rule and the rule
that damages are not available for innocent misrepresentation. In Esso Petroleum v. Mardon,
[ 197611 Q.B. 801 at 817 Lord Denning M.R. frankly acknowledged that a pleading of negligent
misrepresentation (or collateral warranty) was used as a means of avoiding the rule that
innocent misrepresentation gives no right to damages. Lord Denning stated that while he would
have been willing to find a collateral warranty on the facts, he based his decision on negligent
misrepresentation instead of nominal deference to the trial judge's finding of fact that there was
no collateral warranty. In other words, concurrency was used simply to avoid an inconvenient
factual finding by the trial judge.
7. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 720 [hereinafter Fraser-Reid].
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Fraser-Reid will be effectively overruled. 8 The unintended, and, I will
argue, undesirable consequence which the Court has wrought by overrul-
ing Fraser-Reid indirectly rather than directly, is to make it much more
difficult for the parties to fine-tune the terms of their relationship.
It might be objected that introducing an implied third-party benefi-
ciary contract is too much of a change in the law, requiring as it does both
a reversal of Fraser-Reid and the acknowledgment of implied third-party
beneficiary contracts. But addressing "contract torts" (where parties are
sufficiently closely linked to be able to bargain indirectly yet are not in
privity) through tort law also requires major legal change, as tort law has
two deficiencies in this area. The first is that tort law does not yet allow
for recovery of pure economic loss in all situations where that may be
appropriate. The second is that it does not allow the parties (including
subsequent purchasers) to fine-tune their bargain. In Bird the Court has
gone some way towards addressing the first problem, and indicated that
it is willing to go further, but it has not even recognized the second
problem. In view of this it is fair to say that the changes needed on the
contract side are no more radical than allowing tort liability for pure
economic loss flowing from defective products.
The Court has already gone some way to relaxing the privity require-
ment in London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel Int'l.9 That decision did
not go far enough to allow the implementation of a judicially implied
warranty solution in a case such as Bird, as it held that a third party
beneficiary contract must be founded on the clear intent of the parties. The
reluctance to allow judicially implied third party beneficiary contracts
was no doubt motivated by a desire to respect the autonomy of the parties.
But if the Court is considering extending liability among parties in a
contractual chain, an implied warranty which the parties are free to alter
is surely more respectful of the autonomy of the parties than is judicially
imposed tort liability. It would be ironic if a doctrine intended to respect
party autonomy was seen to preclude an autonomy enhancing approach
to extended liability for economic loss. And in any event, the respect for
the intent of the parties is something of a pious sham, as the intention of
the parties is determined by judicial interpretation of the contract, which
in turn is largely guided by judicial policy concerns. To a large extent to
8. Note that while the Court in Fraser-Reid, ibid. declined to change the doctrine of caveat
emptor, it was able to give relief to the purchaser by finding an express warranty. The desire
not to make major changes to the law unless it is unavoidable is laudable, but it would have been
preferable ifthe Court had simply held that since express warranty was found on the facts there
was no need to address the issue of caveat emptor.
9. [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 [hereinafter London Drugs].
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imply a third party beneficiary aspect to the contract would simply make
explicit what is already being done through judicial interpretation of the
contract.1°
But this article is not primarily concerned with whether contract law
can be shaped to address the problem of caveat emptor. Apart from the
foregoing remarks, I will take it as given that an implied warranty of
fitness for habitation which benefits subsequent purchasers is legally
possible for the Supreme Court, and no more radical than the extension
of tort law which the Court has contemplated and partially carried out in
Bird. The primary question is whether such an implied warranty is
desirable as a matter of policy.
To answer this question I start with a law and economics approach to
tort and contract, as it allows a unified functional analysis of contract-
torts. In a context in which the parties are contractually linked, even
indirectly, the central question is whether, given the impediments to a
contractual allocation of risk, an allocation of risk judicially imposed
through tort law can be expected to be superior to the contractual
allocation of risk. Because of information asymmetries and limits on
human rationality the private bargaining process can be expected to lead
to a contract which is not perfectly optimal. But the existence of some
imperfections in contracting does not of itself make the case for judicial
intervention, because the same considerations of information asym-
metries and limits on rationality also imply that judicial decisions will be
imperfect. This means that we must compare the defects in the bargaining
process with the expected defects in the judicial response and assess
whetherjudicial intervention can be expected to do more harm than good.
This requires a relatively detailed examination of the particular class of
transactions in question, as details of the market in question, in particular
its institutional structure and the nature of the item being bargained over,
determine the nature and extent of imperfections in both bargaining and
judicial regulation of the market. On examination of the market for
buildings, I conclude that while there are significant defects in the market
and the current hostility to the doctrine of caveat emptor is warranted,
intervention through tort law to judicially impose terms of the relation-
ship will do more harm than good. However, judicial intervention
through an implied warranty holds considerable promise for improving
the bargaining process with few adverse effects. An implied warranty
would change the background rules of bargaining in a way which can be
10. See N. Siebrasse, "Third-Party Beneficiaries in the Supreme Court of Canada: Catego-
rization and the Interpretation of Ambiguous Contracts" (1995) 45 U.T.L.J. 47.
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expected to improve the outcome, while allowing the parties to fine tune
their allocation of risk in a way which is binding on subsequent purchas-
ers. The analysis of the market for structures also provides insights which
may be more widely applicable.
I. A Unified Approach to Contract and Tort
Tort law is often said to be concerned with the deterrence of accidents and
the compensation of victims. It should not be too controversial to add a
concern for minimizing administrative costs of recovery. While not as
prominent in traditional analyses, this concern is implicitly present, for
example in the floodgates argument." If we emphasize the need for a
balance between these factors, then the traditional description of the goals
of tort law is equivalent to Calabresi's seminal formulation from the law
and economics perspective: tort law is aimed at reducing the costs of
accidents, which entails reducing the likelihood of an accident, the harm
which results if an accident does occur, and the associated administrative
costs.' 2 Contract law on the other hand is often seen as promoting
11. Minimizing administrative costs is as important as deterring accidents, because admin-
istrative costs are ultimately borne by the parties (through higher prices for goods, for instance)
or society at large, just as are the direct costs of accidents (direct accident costs which are fully
insured are borne by society at large rather than by the victim of the loss). Particularly in the
area of pure economic losses, it is clear that direct losses are no different in kind than
administrative costs: both are money.
12. G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale University
Press, 1970). Calabresi's formulation has fallen out of favour in the law and economics
scholarship, probably because it is not susceptible to expression in mathematical terms. The
goal of tort law is more often stated to be the minimization of accident costs, including
administrative costs. This implies a concern with compensation, which is made clear by
Calabresi, as the accident costs include the costs of bearing a large loss, which, because of risk
aversion, is greater than the quantum of the loss itself. This cost can only be avoided through
compensation. Thus, from an economic perspective, tort law's traditional concern for compen-
sation is fundamentally the same as the concern for loss bearing. Phrasing the issue in terms
of loss bearing ability has the salutary effect of emphasizing the importance of insurance issues,
as was emphasized by La Forest J. in his decision in Canadian National Railway Company v.
Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., supra note 1. It is true that many law and economics scholars
ignore compensation on the grounds that insurance is widely available: see R. Posner,
Economic Analysis ofLaw, 4th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1992) at 165-66. But while it is true
that when available, insurance is a much cheaper means of providing compensation than is tort
law (see infra note 28), some insurance markets do not exist, or function poorly. While many
economic analyses do take this into account, formal economic treatments tend to treat
insurance as changing the risk aversion of the parties: see S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of
Accident Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Calabresi's formulation, while
less mathematically tractable, focuses attention on the actual compensation or insurance
market in question and its possible imperfections. It should also be noted that the text refers to
the need to balance compensation and deterrence. In a traditional formulation these are seen
as complementary goals, as the victim is compensated at the same time as the tortfeasor is
deterred. See infra note 28 discussing why these are not entirely complementary goals.
254 The Dalhousie Law Journal
mutually beneficial exchanges and respecting the autonomy of the
parties. But while the focus is different, the underlying premises of tort
and contract law are the same. One way of stating the premise underlying
freedom of contract is that parties with full capacity know best what is
best for themselves, so that any voluntary exchange in which both parties
are fully informed about, and bargain over, all aspects of the exchange,
must benefit both parties. (For convenience, I will refer to the outcome of
such an idealized bargaining process as an optimal contract.) "All aspects
of the exchange" includes the possibility that something will go wrong.
Parties to a contract routinely insert clauses which are directed to
circumstances that both parties hope will never arise, for example
warranty provisions in case of defects, or a liquidated damages clause.
Thus the optimal contract, like tort law, will attempt to minimize the harm
of any unanticipated occurrence, since both parties gain if such costs are
minimized.
The goal of the parties to a contract and the goal of the courts in tort law
are thus fundamentally similar. If optimal contracting were possible,
judicial intervention would never be necessary, since the parties would
already have provided for all contingencies. Moreover, because the
parties have better information about their own needs and circumstances
than does the court, the arrangements which the parties make will be
better than those which the court could provide. This is the reason for a
presumption in favour of private ordering. 3 Of course, optimal contract-
ing is never possible, even in paradigmatic contractual settings, since low
transaction costs, full capacity, voluntary exchange, and full information
are requirements which are never entirely fulfilled. 4 But the view that the
13. The primacy of private ordering has been explicitly recognized by the courts: for instance,
in B.G. Checo Int'l Ltd. v. B.C. Hydro & Power Authority (1993), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 577. La
Forest and McLachlin JJ. for the majority noted that "[Tihe only limit on the right to choose
one's [cause of] action is the principle of private ordering -the right of individuals to arrange
their affairs and assume risks in a different way that would be done by the law of tort" (at 584).
14. The precise scope of these conditions is also difficult to define and normatively laden.
Many law and economics scholars would also add a condition that the market be perfectly
competitive if the exchange is to be considered voluntary: see R.D. Cooter & T.S. Ulen, "Law
and Economics" (Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1988) at 234-36. But so long as the buyer
has the option of not buying, exchanges which are otherwise voluntary will be to the benefit
of the buyer even if the seller is a monopolist. In any event, with perfect information, the
existence of a monopoly will change the price but not the terms of the bargain (see discussion
infra text at note 39), and the terms are the focus of this article. In a similar vein, one standard
criticism from the left is that the property rights themselves ultimately define what is
considered coercive: the choice to work or starve is arguably not a free choice at all: see e.g.
D. Kennedy "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault" in Sexy Dressing etc. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1993). While this argument is technically correct, and I would
defend the institution of contract on other grounds, this article is not intended as a challenge
The Choice Between Implied Warranty and Tort Liability
role of the court is to encourage the optimal contract is nonetheless useful:
by implying that the need for judicial intervention can always be con-
ceived of as stemming from a failure of the bargaining process, the role
of the court in both tort and contract can be seen as that of promoting
outcomes which approximate the optimal contract. 5
There are two main strategies which the court can use to this end. Most
obviously the court can attempt to impose the optimal contract directly:
that is, the court can impose the result which it believes the parties would
have agreed to had they bargained rationally with full information.
Alternatively the court can fashion rules which allow the parties to
overcome impediments to contracting.
There are two general types of situations in which the appropriate
judicial response is to attempt to impose the optimal contract. One is
where the source of the bargaining failure is unavoidably high transaction
costs which make bargaining impossible. This is the case in paradigmatic
"stranger torts" (e.g. automobile accidents) where bargaining between
the parties is not possible and tort law is called upon to invent the
hypothetical bargain wholesale by mimicking the result the parties would
have arrived at had they been able to bargain. High transaction cost
failures of bargaining also occur in classic contracts cases. Even when
transaction costs are low relative to "stranger torts", it is impossible for
even fully informed parties to contract over every contingency which
might impact on the contract. If events unfold to reveal a contingency
which the parties had not anticipated the courts may be called upon to fill
in the gap with the terms the parties would have arrived at had they turned
their attention to the problem.' 6
The court may also attempt to impose the optimal contract directly
when one of the parties did not have the capacity to bargain rationally.
Refusal to enforce contracts entered into by minors is an example. Here
the rationale for judicial imposition of terms is quite different. When the
court must impose terms which the parties had not in fact agreed to
to the mainstream views of contract and property, and I assume voluntariness throughout the
article, which focuses on capacity and information. Of course, "full capacity" is also a
disputable term. Economists do have technical definitions of rationality, but as I argue (see
infra text at note 39) failure by one party to meet these criteria does not of itself justify judicial
intervention. For these reasons the conditions I have set out in the text should not be taken as
precisely defined technical requirements which guarantee a welfare maximizing result (with
the positive normative connotations of that phrase). Rather, they are ill-defined terms which
guide analysis by serving as the focus for more detailed inquiry.
15. For a good discussion of "tort as a hypothetical contract" see R.D. Cooter, "Unity in Tort
Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution" (1985) 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1.
16. See e.g. Posner, supra note 12 at 93; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel "The Corporate
Contract" (1989) 89 Colum. L.R. 1416.
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because of high. transaction costs, the court can attempt to respect the
autonomy of the parties by using the context provided by the contract, if
there is one, or by the surrounding circumstances to decide what particu-
lar bargain these parties might have arrived at. In contrast judicial
intervention justified by the irrationality or "wrong preferences" of one
of the parties is inherently paternalistic: the court is simply substituting
its judgment for that of the parties.
The alternative strategy is to attack the impediments to bargaining
directly by fashioning legal rules which reduce transaction costs, increase
the information available to the parties, or reduce incentives for strategic
bargaining. This approach is most evident in legal rules which directly
require disclosure of information, such as the rule against fraudulent
concealment of defects in the sale of real property, but is also present in
more subtle forms. For instance the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale has been
defended on this basis.17 This is the least paternalistic strategy since it
neither substitutes a hypothetical judicial bargain, nor directly imposes
the court's preferences, but rather seeks to aid the parties in coming to a
bargain in fact.
Direct judicial imposition of the 'terms' is a strategy more commonly
associated with the high bargaining costs of the paradigmatic stranger
torts, whereas background rules which encourage bargaining are associ-
ated with contract where bargaining costs are relatively low to begin with.
But these are simply generalizations, and it is important to remain
sensitive to the underlying policy issues, especially in cases like Bird
which fall on the tort-contract boundary.
The Court's decision on the facts in Bird is difficult to justify in light
of the foregoing analysis, since the existing legal framework provided
clear background rules against which bargaining between sophisticated
parties could take place. While the original purchaser would not be well
placed to originate a warranty, it could have demanded an assignable
warranty from the builder, and, as noted, would have every incentive to
do so in order to maintain the resale price. Given sophisticated parties, it
17. (1854), 9 Ex. 341,156 E.R. 145. See I. Ayres & R. Gertner, "Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules" (1989) 99 Yale L.J. 87; see also W. Bishop,
"The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance" (1983) 12 J. Legal Stud. 24,
suggesting that contract law can be used to force revelation of information. Cf. Kronman,
"Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts" (1978) 7 J. Legal Stud. 1 arguing
that requiring disclosure may reduce incentives to acquire information in the first place. On the
use of contract to counter strategic bargaining see J.S. Johnston, "Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules" (1990) 100 Yale L.J. 615; P. Aghion & B.
Hermalin, "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency" (1990) 6 J. Law,
Econ. & Org. 381; I. Ayres & R. Gertner, "Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules" (1992) 101 Yale L.J. 729.
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can be presumed that the terms of the sale accounted for the fact that the
builder was not providing a warranty. By allowing an action against the
builder in tort, the Court allowed the plaintiff to circumvent arrangements
which it had presumably entered into with full knowledge and benefitted
from through a reduced sale price. 8
One possible explanation for the decision is that the Court assumed
that transaction costs were high and indirect contracting impossible from
the mere fact that the parties were not directly in privity. In other words,
the Court may simply have been fooled by the form of the relationship.
But some aspects of the decision suggest that the assumption that the
plaintiff was not in privity with the builder was not crucial to the decision.
The Court emphasized that contractual and tortious duties can in general
arise concurrently so long as the tort duty arises independently of the
contractual duty. 19 The question then is when does a duty arise "indepen-
dently"? While in the decision the Court explicitly stated only what was
needed for the case at hand, namely that "a contractor's duty to take
reasonable care arises independently of any duty in contract between the
contractor and the original property owner"2 the Court explained that
"the duty in contract with respect to materials and workmanship flows
from the terms of the contract between the contractor and the home owner
[but] by contrast, the duty in tort with respect to materials and workman-
ship flows from the contractor's duty to ensure that the building meets a
reasonable and safe standard of construction," and emphasized that these
duties are distinct. Further, the Court relied on the authority of Central
Trust2' a case in which a concurrent tort claim was allowed between
parties who were in privity. It therefore appears that an original owner,
who is in privity with the builder, can nonetheless rely on Bird to sue the
builder in tort so long as the original contract does not contain an express
18. This is the crux of the criticism of Bird by B. Feldthusen & J.P. Palmer, "Economic Loss
and the Supreme Court of Canada: an Economic Critique of Norsk Steamship and Bird
Construction" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 427 and B. Feldthusen, "Winnipeg Condominium
Corporation No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co.: Who Needs Contract Anymore?" (1995) 25 Can.
Bus. L.J. 143. For sophisticated parties, establishing a broad clear rule, whether or not it is the
rule the parties would bargain to, may be the best way of encouraging bargaining. In this
context, the parties' failure to change the default rule is evidence that it is in fact appropriate.
To the extent that liability for dangerous defects is less clear than a pure rule of caveat emptor,
perhaps because it requires drawing a distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous
defects, it is worse as a matter of policy as it increases wasteful litigation without improving
the substantive allocation of risk: see Feldthusen ibid. at 155.
19. Supra note 3 at 104.
20. Ibid. at 105.
21. Supra note 6.
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disclaimer of liability.22 As suggested earlier, this indicates that the Court
used Bird as an opportunity to indirectly overrule Fraser-Reid. The
question remains why the Court would chose to do so, thereby disrupting
the settled expectations of the parties.
Another possibility is that the decision of the Court was an active
interference in the contract justified by the belief that the Court is better
able to allocate risk between the parties than are the parties themselves.
And indeed, in responding to the argument that the judiciary should
refrain from disrupting the careful allocation of risk in a construction
project, the Court noted that this was merely a version of the traditional
judicial concern for allowing indeterminate liability23 and then proceeded
to argue that indeterminacy was not a serious problem in the circum-
stances. Thus, while the Court recognized the need for a careful allocation
of risk, it felt competent to simply directly substitute its judgment for that
of the parties as to how the risk should be allocated.
It seems most likely that a combination of these factors motivated the
decision in Bird. The Court addressed the issue of the builder's liability
as if it were an issue of first impression. It noted, for instance, that the
Condominium Corporation was unable to detect the defects even after
cracking first appeared, and remarked that this "illustrates the unreality
of the assumption that the purchaser is better placed to detect and bear the
risks of hidden defects. '24 But while the notion that the purchaser is best
placed to protect itself against defects may have been the original
justification for caveat emptor, when the law is settled and the contract is
between sophisticated parties it is better described as a conclusion that an
observer may draw, given that the contract did in fact allocate the risk to
the purchaser. If the case had indeed been an issue of first impression, then
the Court's reasons for allocating default liability to the builder would
have been persuasive, and there would have been no settled expectations
22. In general, the ability of parties to a contract to sue concurrently in tort merely illustrates
the role of the law in filling gaps in contracts, particularly since the tort duty to take reasonable
care, for example, provides a general obligation which may apply in a variety of circumstances
which are difficult to define before the fact. (Of course, the parties could insert an express
equivalent term in the contract, but it is arguably more efficient to legally imply such a term
if it would be routinely inserted in most contracts in any event.) But in this case, there was no
gap to be filled, or more accurately, the law had already filled the gap. As between the original
purchaser and the builder, the recently reaffirmed contract doctrine of caveat emptor clearly
applied, and as between the builder and subsequent purchasers the traditional rule against
recovery for pure economic loss in such circumstances would have applied. Given sophisti-
cated parties who were aware of the existing law on this point, the gap filling rationale is not
convincing.
23. Supra note 3 at 124.
24. Ibid. at 128.
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to militate against liability. The Court may have been less than attentive
to the possibility of indirect contracting both because it was overly
confident in its own ability to impose the appropriate allocation of risk
directly, and because of the lack of direct privity.
The foregoing arguments against the decision in Bird are much weaker
when applied to less sophisticated parties, where bounded rationality on
the part of purchasers makes much less plausible the assumption that the
purchaser was aware of and accounted for the absence of an implied
warranty of sound construction. In view of this, it is ironic that the
problem of disturbing settled law was central to the Court's decision to
reaffirm caveat emptor in Fraser-Reid but was entirely ignored in Bird.
The point is much more compelling on the facts in Bird, which involved
sophisticated parties, than on the facts in Fraser-Reid which concerned
the purchaser of a private home.
But simply because the prima facie argument in favour of judicial risk
allocation is stronger in the case of residential home buyers, it is not
necessarily compelling. This brings us to a central theme of this article.
If freedom of contract is premised on the notion that the parties know what
is best for themselves, thenjudicial intervention is invited whenever there
is reason to believe that the bargaining process was imperfect. Since the
bargaining process is never perfect, it follows that judicial intervention is
always justified. But in truth freedom of contract rests on a much weaker
premise, namely that the parties know what is best for themselves better
than do the courts. To justify direct judicial imposition of a bargain it is
not sufficient to show that there may have been a breakdown in the
bargaining process. We must also show that the courts are sufficiently
well-equipped that judicial intervention will do more good than harm.
The imperfections in judicial intervention must receive as much attention
as the imperfections of the bargaining process. In the following section
of this article, I will explore the ways in which asymmtery of information
and bounded rationality may affect the bargaining process. I conclude
that neither of these problems is sufficiently severe to justify judicial
imposition of what the court believes to be the optimal contract. I then
suggest that the problems which do arise may be ameliorated by an
alternative strategy of fashioning rules which encourage bargaining and
that a disclaimable implied warranty of fitness for habitation could be
justified on this basis. In other words, caveat emptor is not a desirable rule,
but it should be replaced by an approach which encourages the parties to
bargain for themselves, rather than one in which the courts bargain for the
parties.
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II. Impediments to Contracting
1. Asymmetric Information
A bargain can be presumed to be in the best interests of both parties only
if both are fully informed as to the ramifications of their decision. But
information is costly to acquire, so the parties to a contract will never
acquire all the information which is possibly relevant. Rather they will
acquire information only to the point where it is cost-effective to do so.
In other respects the parties will remain "rationally ignorant".
To see the potential consequences of rational ignorance for contract-
ing, consider the demand for warranties in an idealized market where the
sellers are repeat players and each buyer only purchases once . 2  The
buyer's rights against the seller will depend on the terms of the contract
and the background legal rules. However, there is a cost to the buyer of
discovering her rights. To the extent that her rights are determined by the
contract, the cost is that of the time it takes to read and understand the fine
print. To the extent that her rights are determined by background rules of
law, such as caveat emptor, the cost to the buyer of becoming informed
about her rights will be even higher. If the cost of finding out the truth
about her rights is much greater than the benefit, the effort may not be
worthwhile. For example, if the product is an inexpensive consumer
product which rarely malfunctions, so that the expected loss from a
malfunction is very low, it may not be worth reading the fine print to
discover that the manufacturer has disclaimed liability for malfunctions.
Even if the possible loss from a defective product is relatively high, if the
25. The discussion in this section is adapted from A. Schwartz, "Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Example of Warranties and Security Interests" (1983) 69 Va.
L. Rev. 1387; A. Schwartz & L. Wilde, "Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Perfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630; G. Priest, "A
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1297; and M.A. Eisenberg,
"The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract" (1995) 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211. (See also
A. Schwartz, "Unconscionability and Imperfect Information: A Research Agenda" (1991) 19
Can. Bus. L.J. 437.) Priest presents the classic statement of the "comparative advantage" view
of warranties, i.e. that consumer product warranties allocate responsibility in a way which
reflects the comparative advantage of consumers and manufacturers in reducing the costs of
defects. Schwartz & Wilde and Schwartz, ibid. extend this by analysing the effect of costly
information (rational ignorance) on the market for warranties. They consider the problem of
irrationality, but are largely dismissive, primarily for the second reason discussed below (at
infra text following note 42), namely the difficulty of making predictions based on psychologi-
cal models of decision making. They are also inclined to minimize the extent of irrationality
in decision making. Eisenberg discusses the implications of both irrationality and rational
ignorance for a number of contract doctrines, including product warranties, but does not
distinguish adequately between the normative implications of the two types of bargaining
failure, nor does he fully explore the effect on the problem of irrationality of market responses
to imperfect information.
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cost of finding out one's legal rights is also high, it may still not be
worthwhile to do so. On the other hand, while the cost to the seller of
reading and understanding the fine print or discovering the background
rule is no less than the cost to the buyer, the seller (in our idealized market)
is a repeat player. This means that the cost need only be incurred once, and
can be spread over a large number of contracts, so the cost per contract
of knowing the law is much lower for the seller than for the buyer. Thus,
in our simplified scenario, the seller will know the implications of the fine
print, while the buyer will not.
In contrast, for the buyer (as for the seller) information about the main
terms of the contract, in particular the price, is easy to grasp and is certain
to be important. This suggests that the buyer will make her purchase
decision only on the basis of the major terms such as price and ignore the
fine print warranties. The result will be fine print unfavourable to the
buyer: risk or hidden costs will be shifted to the buyer wherever possible.
In a competitive market a seller is driven to include such unfavourable
terms since if he does not he will be undercut in price by a competitor who
lowers her costs by including the unfavourable terms. If the market is a
monopoly the result is the same: while the monopolist is not driven by fear
of losing business to a competitor it will include unfavourable terms in
order to increase its profits.
2 6
But the case for judicial intervention is far weaker than this simplified
scenario indicates. An "unfavourable" clause, that is, one which shifts the
risk to the buyer, may nonetheless be desirable from the consumer's
perspective if the cost savings more than compensate for the risks which
are shifted to the consumer. Epstein gives the striking example of the
warranty found on a standard box of computer diskettes, which limits
liability to the replacement cost of the diskette.27 The manufacturer is best
able to avoid defects in the diskette, but the consumer is best able to avoid
harm resulting from a defect, by backing up the information on another
disk. As a consumer of diskettes, I for one, would prefer to make backup
copies of my diskettes rather than paying insurance premiums to the
manufacturer to cover the potentially enormous losses which could occur
if some other user, for want of a backup copy, lost valuable information
as a result of a defective disk.
26. The monopolist need not lower its price to compensate for unfavourable terms since the
monopoly price depends on the demand curve for the good given the buyer's implicit
assumptions regarding the terms.
27. R. Epstein, "Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contracts"
(1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 105.
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Since at least some superficially unfavourable clauses are nonetheless
desirable, simply striking down all clauses which limit liability would be
counter-productive. Unfortunately, there is no easy test which a court can
apply to determine whether a clause is undesirable from the purchaser's
perspective. In a competitive market, the buyer will always get some
benefit from an apparently unfavourable clause, because the cost savings
to the seller will be passed on to the buyer through price competition
between sellers. To determine whether a clause is desirable the court must
calculate the magnitude of the offsetting monetary benefit from the clause
and determine whether the trade-off is beneficial: in effect, the court must
deduce the optimal contract. But to deduce the optimal contract in any
detail is far beyond the competence of the court. As we have seen, the
optimal contract strikes a balance between reducing the likelihood of an
accident, minimizing the harm which results if an accident does occur,
and minimizing the associated administrative costs. This requires knowl-
edge of factors such as the details of the cost to the manufacturer of
avoiding defective products, the types of damage likely to result from
normal wear and tear, the consumer's use patterns and preferred trade-off
between cost and quality, the risk preferences of the parties and the nature
of the relevant insurance markets. These different imperatives may and
often do point in different directions, and it is rare that the optimal contract
will result in one party bearing all the risk.28 Rather, contractual solutions
28. The two most prominent arguments in favour of strict liability for defective products,
namely risk internalization and risk spreading, both fail to recognize the complexity of the
trade-offs which need to be made. The risk internalization argument says that the party which
creates the risk should bear it in order to have the proper incentives to minimize the expected
losses. But in almost any instance both parties can take at least some steps to avoid the harm,
so that optimal deterrence requires "internalizing" the risk to both parties at the same time. This
means that in general it is not possible to speak of one party "creating" the risk, and so it begs
the question to argue that the risk should be "internalized" to the party which creates it. The
question is the complex one of what is the best allocation of different aspects of risk in light
of the different steps which either party may be able to take to protect itself. In some
circumstances it may be that one party is so much better placed to bear the risk that it should
bear all the risk, but making this determination requires a detailed analysis. The phrase "risk
internalization" is misleading at best and incoherent at worst, and should be avoided in the
interests of clarity of analysis. The other main argument in favour of manufacturers' liability
is that the manufacturer is better able to spread the risk. While this argument may have had
general merit before the advent of well developed markets for personal insurance, it is now
clear that risk can be spread much more efficiently through first party accident insurance than
via tort law and ultimately through the defendant's insurer, because of reduced legal fees and
administrative costs associated with first party insurance: see N. Siebrasse, "Economic
Analysis of Economic Loss in The Supreme Court of Canada: Fault, Deterrence and Channel-
ling of Losses in CNR v. NorskPacific Steamship Co." (1994) 20 Queen's L.J. 1 at 24-28. And
aside from the higher litigation costs of third party insurance, enterprise liability may lead to
significant distortions in manufacturers' insurance market because of problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard: see G. Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem TortLaw"
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incorporate a careful balancing of incentives for both parties. The courts
when faced with the resolution of individual disputes are rarely even
presented with evidence required to determine an optimal contract, and
in any event there is little hope that the comprehensive information
necessary to reach an optimal contract could be reliably extracted after the
fact at any reasonable cost. The great advantage which the court has is that
it knows which of the myriad possible states of the world actually came
to pass. If the possibility was sufficiently remote or bargaining costs were
sufficiently high that the parties did not bargain with it in mind, then the
court may have no choice but to fill in the gap. But we can be confident
that the solution imposed by the court ex post will be significantly inferior
to that which would have been bargained for by the parties, if they had
addressed their minds to the particular state of the world which eventuated. 9
This suggests that the courts should hesitate to intervene except when
there is reason to believe that the parties did not contemplate a particular
outcome and when there is a gross departure from the judicial estimate of
the optimal contract. 3° These criteria are related, since a contract which
apparently provides for an unreasonable outcome in a particular set of
circumstances is some evidence that the parties did not turn their mind to
those circumstances. But given that a court's ability to determine the
optimal contract is limited we cannot conclude that a contract is in fact
unreasonable simply because it appears to the court to be unreasonable.
Indeed, for a number of reasons egregious failures of bargaining due
to rational ignorance are far less likely to arise than is suggested by the
unrealistically simplified scenario so far described. The first reason for
this is perhaps obvious, but nonetheless deserves emphasis: the argument
only applies when the bargaining process can plausibly be thought to be
impaired by rational ignorance. The facts in Bird are precisely those in
which the rational actor model is most likely to be satisfied, and these
(1986)96 Yale L.J. 1521 arguing that manufacturers' liability was in large part responsible for
the insurance crisis of the 1980s. In some cases first-party insurance markets may be non-
existent or inefficient, so that a compensatory argument can be made in favour of tort liability,
but at the very least it can no longer be taken as self-evident that in general the manufacturer
or seller is best placed to spread the risk through insurance.
29. See G. Hadfield, "Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts"
(1994)23J. Legal Stud. 159 for an exploration of the effect of limited judicial competence on
the appropriate judicial strategies in filling contractual gaps.
30. CfLloyds Bank v. Bundy, [1974] 3 All ER 757 (C.A.) in which Lord Denning M.R. stated
that the law would hold a contract unconscionable because of inequality of bargaining power
when there was both evidence that the bargaining capacity of the plaintiff was impaired and the
contract itself was a gross departure from what would have been reasonable (at 765): ignorance
and lack of independent advice gives a prima facie justification for intervention, but unless the
contract is grossly unfair, we cannot be sure that judicial intervention will do more harm than
good.
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facts are hardly extraordinary. If intervention is justified on the facts of
Bird, it is justified in any contract. If the lawyers for the purchaser in Bird
were unaware of the doctrine of caveat emptor surely the appropriate
response is to encourage the purchaser to hire better lawyers in the future
by holding it to its contract.
It is also an oversimplification to suggest that even relatively unsophis-
ticated parties uniformly never read or understand the fine print. Different
consumers have different search patterns, and in many situations at least
some will take the trouble to inform themselves of the consequences of
the fine print. If a sufficient proportion of buyers do read the fine print and
it is costly to offer distinct contacts, then sellers will compete to offer good
fine print terms to those consumers who do shop carefully, and other
consumers can piggy back off this effort. And "fine print" is insufficiently
precise: to this point I have used it as a shorthand to mean contractual
terms which a one-time buyer will rationally ignore, but this does not
imply that all print which is physically small will in fact be ignored. The
more important the fine print clause, that is, the greater the expected value
of the presence of the clause, and the less difficult it is to understand, the
more likely it is that a significant number of consumers will be able to
overcome the information cost barrier and inform themselves of its
implications.
A related point is that if the warranty is sufficiently desirable to the
consumer, it may be worthwhile for a manufacturer to offer the warranty
and advertise it.' The manufacturer will gain business rather than losing
it, because if the warranty is desirable the higher price to the consumer is
31. Schwartz & Wilde and Schwartz, both supra note 25, have extensive discussions of
theory and empirical evidence on consumer search patterns. Eisenberg, supra note 25, claims
that "most form takers will find it irrational to engage in search and deliberation on any given
form" at 244. He supports this assertion with a report of an informal survey of law and
economics scholars which indicated that few knew of the specific terms of their chequing
accounts and that few balanced their chequebooks. But this simply shows that people are
sometimes rationally ignorant, which no one denies, particularly when the cost of ignorance
is low. (1 suggest that if monthly chequing account fees were $50, most law and economics
scholars would be aware of this fact.) One cannot conclude from this that people are ignorant
of very important non-price terms in all or even most circumstances. Further, Eisenberg makes
no mention of the role of advertising, as opposed to pure consumer search, in overcoming
rational ignorance about egregious fine print terms. Warranty advertising is of course extensive
in the case of many consumer products, e.g. automobile warranties. In the real estate market
we also see advertising regarding paradigmatic fine print mortgage terms, such as the right to
prepay, and the right to skip occasional payments. J.M. Ramseyer, "Products Liability Through
Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Experiment" (1996) 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1823 shows that
although formal Japanese products liability law prior to 1995 was a negligence regime, many
manufacturers voluntarily combined voluntary safety testing with a strict liability warranty
which was indicated by a standardized "SG" (Safety Goods) label.
The Choice Between Implied Warranty and Tort Liability
more than offset by the protection offered. This suggests that in cases
egregious enough that the courts can intervene with confidence, market
forces are likely to work to overcome the problem of rational ignorance
even without judicial intervention.32
Nonetheless, it is plausible that there are cases in which rational
ignorance leads a purchaser to make a decision she would not have made
with full information. But the appropriate response to this type of
bargaining failure is arguably not to impose judicially fashioned liability
in tort, but rather to provide the relevant information so as to encourage
bargaining. An implied warranty could achieve this result because a
return to caveat emptor would require an express disclaimer in the
contract. This would reduce the cost of discovering the relevant informa-
tion, perhaps sufficiently to overcome the problem of rational ignorance.
This option will be discussed at length below, after we examine a different
potential justification for judicial intervention, namely irrationality on
the part of the purchaser.
2. Irrationality
Good decision making also requires the ability to rationally process
relevant information. Empirical research into decision making under
uncertainty has demonstrated a host of systematic departures from a
subjective utility maximizing models of decision making.33 For example,
studies show that in making decisions regarding uncertain events people
are often over-optimistic; 34 that the probability of events which are easily
called to mind perhaps because of wide reporting (airplane crashes) or
personal experience are over-estimated ("salience" or "availability");
32. To the extent that the advertising informs the purchaser of a common issue, e.g. that the
default rule is caveat emptor, advertising is a public good and the first to advertise will not reap
all the benefits. This may be one reason why advertising competition over warranty terms may
be slow to develop; see infra Genesis of Warranty Corporations at part VI. This suggests that
advertising is more likely to develop if one manufacturer has a comparative advantage in
offering a warranty, although competition for market share might often be a sufficient
incentive.
33. A good review is found in C.F. Camerer & H. Kunreuther, "Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications" (1989) 8 J. Policy Analysis & Mgmt. 565; see also D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
34. Most newly married couples correctly estimate the chance that a marriage will end in
divorce as 50% and at the same time estimate the chance that their marriage will end in divorce
as 0%: see L.A. Baker & R.E. Emory, "When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage" (1993) 17 Law & Human
Behav. 439. Similarly, 90% of drivers believe they are better than average: 0. Svenson, "Are
We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?" (1981) 47 Acta Psychologica
143. This can be summed up as a belief that "it couldn't happen to me".
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that low-probability high-consequence risks may be under-estimated35 or
over-estimated;36 and that the decision taken depends strongly on the way
in which the question is presented, in particular whether the decision is
posed as involving gains or losses ("framing" effect).37
It has been argued that this systematic "irrationality" in risk assess-
ment may provide a good justification for judicial intervention in con-
tracts.38 Even if the rational ignorance problem is overcome and the
purchaser is made aware of the risk in question, he may not give sufficient
weight to the risk of the accident because of over-optimism and/or under-
estimation of low-probability events. This argument is distinct from the
rational ignorance argument both conceptually and in its policy implica-
tions. Because the purchaser may irrationally choose not to buy a
favourable warranty even if fully informed, encouraging informed bar-
gaining may not be a solution. We might therefore prefer that the court
impose the warranty in a non-disclaimable fashion (e.g. in tort), or,
conversely, that the court ignore disclaimers of warranty. But while the
evidence is clear that a simple expected utility model of decision making
is not always descriptively accurate, there are a number of difficulties
with this argument, which may be summarized as follows: first, the
normative implications of "irrational" behaviour are unclear; second, the
empirical implications of these behaviour patterns are difficult to predict
in any given specific set of circumstances; and third, it is by no means
obvious that judges can make better risk assessments than the purchaser,
35. In a classic empirical study H. Kunreuther, et al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public
Policy Lessons (New York: Wiley, 1978) found that arelatively small proportion of homeowners
living in hazardous areas protected themselves against flood and earthquake damage. They
argue that this is because individuals refuse to attend to or worry about events whose probability
is below some threshold.
36. W.A. Magat, W.K. Viscusi & J. Huber, "Risk-Dollar Tradeoffs, Risk Perceptions, and
Consumer Behaviour" in W.K. Viscusi & W.A. Magat, Learning About Risk: Consumer and
Worker Responses to Hazard Information (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at
c. 5. finding that people reported a willingness to pay the equivalent of $120,000 to avoid a hand
burn from drain opener which would be fully healed within a week.
37. In one of the best known experiments on the framing effect, the choice between two
hypothetical courses of treatment for a disease was shown to depend strongly on whether the
outcomes were presented in negative terms (lives lost) or positive terms (lives saved): see A.
Tversky & D. Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice" (1981)
211 Science 453. A good review is found in A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions" in R.M. Hogarth & M.W. Reder, eds., Rational Choice: The
Contrast Between Economics and Psychology (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1987)
[hereinafter Rational Choice].
38. Eisenberg, supra note 25; R.L. Hasen, (Comment) "Efficiency Under Informational
Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules" (1990) 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 391. Hasen
is more moderate in his recommendations than is Eisenberg, arguing mainly that irrationality
in decision making must be taken into account.
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since judges are as subject as anyone else to decision making biases. I will
examine these issues in order.
The term "irrationality" is misleading because of its strong normative
connotations: "irrational" behaviour is to be avoided.39 But used descrip-
tively it simply means behaviour inconsistent with a postulated descrip-
tion of rationality, which may be formal, such as expected utility theory,4"
or informal, such as the idea that paying $120,000 to avoid a mild bum
is irrational.4' These postulates of rationality may be attractive as a
description of rationality but this hardly implies that the courts should
step in to enforce behaviour which is rational according to these tenets.
The observation that people under-estimate the probability of low-
probability events is equivalent to saying that people are risk-seeking
rather than risk averse with respect to low-probability events; in other
words people sometimes choose to gamble. Gambling may be undesir-
able, but judicial intervention to prohibit it is not uncontroversial.
Similarly, subjective assessment of risk can vary significantly depending
on the form in which the same relevant information is presented (the
framing effect), but this gives no guidance to the court in determining
which of the different subjective risk assessments is "correct". Judicial
intervention to enforce "rational" behaviour is a paternalistic strategy in
which the court is implicitly asserting that it knows better than the
individual what is that person's best interest. In contrast, the argument in
favour of extended liability based on rational ignorance which was
sketched above rests on a much weaker normative assumption, namely
that more information is better than less information when a purchaser is
faced with a decision. This justification fully respects the autonomy of the
individual since the final decision remains with the purchaser.
In suggesting that individual irrationality is normatively suspect, I am
not making the libertarian argument that the choices of the individual
must be respected in all circumstances. On the contrary, I am quite willing
to say that in some circumstances the individual in question just doesn't
39. Eisenberg, supra note 25, refers to "cognitive deficiency" which has similarly strong
normative connotations.
40. Classic statements of expected utility theory are found in J. von Neumann &
0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1944) at 26-27 and L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Wiley, 1954).
For a succinct summary of the basic assumptions see Rational Choice, supra note 37 at 68-69.
41. See supra note 36. Note that systematic under- or over-estimation of low-probability risks
per se is not necessarily inconsistent with expected utility theory and so is not necessarily
irrational in this formal sense. A refusal to buy subsidized disaster insurance may be considered
irrational nonetheless because of a subjective judgment by policy makers that the cost-benefit
trade-off favours insurance. On the other hand, the fact that assessment of risk changes
depending on how the risk is presented (the framing effect) is formally irrational.
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know what is best and social intervention in their decision-making is
justified (for example in the case of present day teenagers who begin
smoking with full knowledge that cigarettes cause cancer). Rather I am
arguing that the simple fact of a departure from an academic model of
perfect rationality is not in itself a compelling argument that the indi-
vidual decision making process is so defective that judicial intervention
is required. If the psychological literature is correct, most decision
making under uncertainty is irrational to some extent: this does not justify
ubiquitous judicial intervention. Rather, the courts should intervene only
when they are satisfied that the decision-making process has failed
egregiously .4 2
A second difficulty with irrationality as a justification for judicial
intervention in contracts is that psychological models of risk assessment
are very difficult to apply. While studies have succeeded in demonstrat-
ing departures from utility maximizing behaviour in a wide variety of
circumstances, and particularly in the assessment of low-probability risk,
the psychological models are complex. Subjective assessment of risk
appears to depend strongly on the specific form in which the choice is
presented. We know from a specific empirical study that people tend not
to buy flood insurance even at subsidized rates. At the same time, people
often do purchase extended warranties on consumer goods at prices
which are apparently significantly higher than is actuarially fair.43 Is
building warranty protection more like flood insurance or more like
extended warranties on consumer goods? Psychological theories of
decision making are not of much help in answering this question in the
42. This should not be taken to suggest that increasing the availability of information can be
clearly demarcated from imposing a decision. Since decision-making under uncertainty has
been shown to be strongly influenced by the form in which the information is presented, the
choice of the form in which information is delivered is itself normatively laden. In extreme
cases the manner of presenting the information may largely determine the decision. There is
nonetheless an important difference between increasing the information available through the
implied warranty approach and imposing a decision under the tort approach. A serious
shortcoming in Eisenberg's argument (supra note 25) is that while he identifies rational
ignorance and irrationality as separate types of "bounded rationality" he largely conflates them
normatively, and uncritically assumes that failures of rationality justify judicial action.
43. The Consumer Union of the US Inc. in its 1996 Buying Guide (Consumer Reports, Vol.60
No. 13) indicates that for televisions "an extended service contract is a bad investment" (at 29)
and that retailers push service contracts for audio and video equipment aggressively because
of estimated profits ranging from 40 to 77 percent (at 14). Cognitive psychology supports the
intuition that the decision to purchase warranty protection is strongly influenced by how hard
the warranty is "sold", as the risk of an event which is described in specific and concrete detail
will be over-estimated. Casual observation suggests that (apparently without the benefit of
formal training in the psychology of risk assessment) some discount sellers of consumer goods
offer a very low price, then make a profit by selling warranties at inflated prices by emphasizing
the risk of product failure.
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abstract. Prediction of the direction of bias in decision-making is difficult
at best and perhaps impossible without a detailed description of the
decision-making context, in particular the nature of the market and the
product sold." This means that it is difficult to make robust normative
recommendations.
Finally, there can be no doubt that judges are as susceptible to decision
making biases as anyone else.45 Indeed, one of the most compelling and
well-documented biases is particularly likely to affect judges. The
"hindsight" bias is the tendency to regard an event which has actually
occurred as having been much more predictable than it truly was.46
Whenever a plaintiff comes before the court having suffered a loss, we
can say, with the benefit of hindsight, that it would have been better for
that individual to have purchased insurance or a warranty, even though
not purchasing insurance may have been entirely rational at the time of
the purchase if the expected loss was smaller than the insurance premium.
That is, it may be that the victim was unlucky but not irrational. The
hindsight bias makes it more likely that the failure to purchase insurance
will be viewed as irrational rather than simply unlucky since the probabil-
ity of loss will be over-estimated by the court. Since all judicial decision
making occurs with the benefit of hindsight, empirical psychology
indicates that there will be a strong tendency for courts to impose over-
insurance. This over-insurance by the courts is as irrational as the
purported under-insurance by individuals making decisions ex ante,
since neither is welfare maximizing. Without specific empirical research
it is not possible to say which effect is worse.
44. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 25, and Schwartz, supra note 25, emphasize the role of
advertising in reducing search costs, but it is just as relevant to the problem of irrationality, as
advertising by manufacturers changes the "framing" of the choice as well as providing buyers
with more information. Eisenberg, supra note 25, does not consider this aspect of the
warranties.
45. There is some evidence professionals working in their area of expertise are also
susceptible to various forms of irrationality in decision making: see the description by Tversky
and Kahneman of the effect of framing on a medical problem presented to physicians: Rational
Choice, supra note 37 at 84ff. In any event construction is not an area of judicial expertise.
46. B. Fischhoff, "Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty" (1975) 1 J. Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor-
mance 288; B. Fischhoff & R. Beyth, "I Knew It Would Happen ... Remembered Probabilities
of Once-Future Things" (1974) 13 Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance 1. See
K.A. Kamin & J.J. Rachlinski, "Ex Post # Ex Ante-Determining Liability in Hindsight"
(1995) 19 Law & Human Behav. 89 (hindsight bias in assessing adequacy of municipal flood
preparation); D.J. Lowe & P.M.J. Reckers, "The Effects of Hindsight Bias on Juror Evaluations
of Auditor Decisions" (t994) 25 Decision Sciences 401 (hindsight bias by jurors in assessing
auditor performance); J.L. Anderson, D.J. Lowe, & P.M.J. Reckers, "Evaluation of Auditor
Decisions-Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap" (1993) 14 J. Econ. Psych. 711
(hindsight bias in American federal and state judges in assessing auditor performance).
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In summary, both rational ignorance and "irrationality" lead to con-
tracts which differ from those which would have been entered into by
fully informed subjective utility maximizing consumers. This in itself
does not justify judicial intervention. Rather we must ask whether a
judicially imposed solution is likely to be better than the admittedly
imperfect bargain. Since the courts, like the parties, suffer from imperfect
information and irrationality, there can be no presumption that bargaining
failure justifies judicial intervention. This is not a prescription for non-
intervention: since the parties and the courts suffer from different forms
of bounded rationality, judicial intervention will be beneficial in some
circumstances. It is important though, that the courts intervene only in
circumstances where there is reason to think that intervention will do
more good than harm.
III. Warranties for New Homes
1. The New Home Warranty Programs
This section applies the theory discussed above to warranties for struc-
tures. The justification for judicial intervention in warranty terms de-
pends on the functioning of the market in question, and there are several
distinct markets for structures. The first we will examine is the market for
residences, as purchasers are most likely to be unsophisticated.
Intuition suggests that for residential home buyers at least, who do not
have ready access to alternative insurance against defective homes, the
optimal contract for purchase of a home would include a warranty against
defects. Builder/developers will often engage in many more home
transactions than will residential buyers, and the law of caveat emptor in
home sales is both counter-intuitive and difficult for an unaided home
buyer to discover. Thus we should be alerted to the problem of distortion
of the market because of rational ignorance.
But, as noted, the simple rational ignorance story is too pessimistic. In
the case of buildings, New Home Warranty Corporations have been
privately established in each province to provide warranties (the "War-
ranty") for new residences,47 except in Ontario which has an equivalent
47. New Home Warranty of British Columbia Inc, (British Columbia and the Yukon); New
Home Warranty Corp. of Alberta; New Home Warranty Program of Saskatchewan; New
.Home Warranty Program of Manitoba Inc.; La Guarantie des maisons neuves de I'APCHQ,
Les Plans de Guarantie de I'ACQ Inc (Quebec); the Atlantic New Home Warranty Corp. (all
the Atlantic provinces). These programs are all non-profit organizations organized by builders.
An independent program, the National Home Warranty Program, started operation in 1990 in
Alberta and has recently moved into B.C.
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statutorily established program.48 While some details vary between
jurisdictions, the broad outline of the program and many of the details are
common. The Corporations are non-profit corporations whose members
are residential home builders. Builders must apply and be accepted into
the program. Builders who are members can enroll any residential unit
they construct in the program on payment of a fee ranging from roughly
$150-$900 per residential unit for five year protection.49 The majority of
homes would be covered for $400 or less. In some jurisdictions member
builders are obliged to enroll all homes they construct in the program, but
even in those where there is no such requirement essentially all homes
built by a member builder are enrolled, no doubt because builders who are
eligible for the warranty program find that offering a home with a
warranty makes it more aitractive, despite the modest increase in price.
Since most established builders are members of their regional or provin-
cial Warranty Corporation the individual homes which are not covered
are primarily those built by individuals building homes for themselves,
or by small builders who build houses for sale on an occasional basis, as
well as mobile homes and housing built under social housing programs.
The result is that a large proportion of new homes in Canada are covered
by such Warranty protection.50
An express warranty is of course much easier to read than the judicial
decisions establishing the default rule of caveat emptor. Not only are the
warranties themselves reasonably free of legalese, but the Corporations
also provide brochures which accurately explain and describe the war-
ranty and crucial terms. This supports the theoretical argument that
builders will find it in their interest to inform the public of the terms of the
fine print, in order to attract business. The information asymmetry
problem is overcome by advertising, at least for those prospective
purchasers who inquire seriously about a new home which is covered by
the Program. Further, there is some spillover of information since it is the
practice of most real estate agents to inform a prospective purchaser of the
48. Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, S.O. 1976, c. 52, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.31.
49. The basis for determining the enrolment fee varies between jurisdictions. A sliding scale
based on the price of the house is the most common factor, although it is not used universally,
and builder experience and/or type of residence are also considered in some jurisdictions.
50. The Warranty Corporations generally indicate that a significant majority of commercial
residential builders are enrolled, although there appear to be significant variations in coverage
between jurisdictions, and coverage in urban areas is higher throughout the country, as more
homes in rural areas are built by builders who are not commercial builders. Overall, at least hat
of new homes, excluding mobile homes and social housing, are covered, and the proportion is
probably significantly higher. In Ontario all new homes except those built and occupied by the
home owner are covered by the program since all builders and vendors of new homes must be
registered under the Ontario New Home Warranties Act, supra note 48, s. 6.
272 The Dalhousie Law Journal
warranty when showing a home which is eligible. Presumably most
purchasers then notice the omission when no mention is made of a
warranty when they view a home which is not covered by the program.
Thus in many cases even a purchaser who does not ultimately purchase
a home which is covered will be aware that their home is not covered by
a warranty. While this fits the argument made earlier suggesting that
market forces will drive vendors to provide warranties where it is
desirable to do so, we shall see that the Warranty Corporations did not
arise simply as a market response to information failure." Nonetheless,
the existence of the Warranty Program must be taken into account when
deciding whether builder's liability should be extended in tort.
We should not expect the Warranty which is offered to be optimal in
a strong sense. To fashion the optimal warranty the Warranty Corporation
would need to know the distribution of marginal costs of improvement in
construction techniques of its members, the statistical marginal benefit of
these construction techniques in terms of reducing defects, the risk
preference distribution of the buyers, and the details of a number of other
factors which will be discussed below. Corporations, like individuals, are
faced with limited information processing capacity and are unlikely to be
able to correctly amass and process the information needed to optimize
perfectly through ex ante calculations. Rather, optimizing behaviour can
be expected to arise, if at all, as a result of a sort of natural selection from
among the various quasi-random attempts at optimization, so that only
those firms which offer the best products, perhaps through luck as much
as planning, will survive and prosper.52 The selection pressure comes
from competitive forces (a firm with a good warranty will have more sales
than a firm with a poor warranty), the shareholders' pursuit of maximum
share value, and the threat of managerial displacement by takeovers.53
These selection pressures are weak in the case of the Warranty
Programs. The profit pressure felt by a monopolist is absent because there
51. See Genesis of Warranty Corporations, infra part VI.
52. Different consumers have different tastes for risk, so, neglecting transaction costs,
individually optimal warranties would be different for every buyer. But we cannot neglect
transaction costs, and having only one warranty company undoubtedly reduces the adminis-
trative costs of offering the warranty, which may, on the whole, more than compensate for the
lack of variety: see e.g. B. Klein, "Transaction Costs Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements" (1979) 70 Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. & Proc. 356.
53. For classic statements of this position see A. Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution and
Economic Theory" (1950) 58 J. Pol. Econ. 211 and M. Friedman, "The Methodology of
Positive Economics" in M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University
Chicago Press, 1953). The optimization is "quasi-random" because, given that the firms have
incentives to attempt to maximize, the strategies which are attempted will not be entirely
random even if bounded rationality introduces an element of noise.
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is no real monopoly. Individual builders are still in competition over
price, which implies that the gains from the warranty will be reaped
primarily by the consumer. Nor do managers face the discipline of a
takeover market. Perhaps most importantly, direct selection pressure
from competition over warranty terms is weak. Since there has tradition-
ally been only one Warranty Corporation in most jurisdictions54 the main
alternative is to buy from a non-member builder, who is small and almost
certainly does not offer any significant warranty protection (recall that the
Programs only cover residences). An independent insurer, the National
Home Warranty Program started operation in 1990 in Alberta and has
recently moved into B.C., but it competes solely on price, offering the
same warranty coverage as the Warranty Corporation of the jurisdiction
in which it operates. Thus competition does not create significant pres-
sure to experiment with warranty terms. On the other side of the bargain,
it also seems unlikely that purchasers will demand changes in the terms
so long as they are roughly acceptable because once a reasonable
warranty is offered the effort required to demand small improvements is
disproportionate to the possible benefit and precise calculations of the
optimal bargain are probably beyond the information processing abilities
of the purchasers.16
But a comparative analysis is required. In order to justify judicial
intervention it is not enough to show that the contract which the parties
arrive at is non-optimal: it must also be shown that the courts can do
better. Thus for the purpose of my argument I do not need to claim that
the Warranty offered by the Corporations is optimal in any strong sense,
but only that it is plausibly as good or better than that which could be
54. An exception is Quebec, which has had two competing warranty programs for a
considerable time.
55. An informal warranty may be offered-"I'11 fix any problems"-but this is unlikely to
credibly extend to major structural defects as the small builders who are not members of the
Program will often be financially unable to guarantee protection, and may well have disap-
peared by the time problems appear. One of the major advantages of the Warranty Program is
that the Corporation takes ultimate responsibility for repairing major structural defects, thus
eliminating the problem of impecunious builders.
56. These points are variations on rational ignorance and irrationality. I argue that these
problems of bounded rationality prevent bargaining to the optimal contract even though they
do not prevent reaching and roughly optimal contract because as the contract approaches the
optimal contract the effect of rational ignorance and irrationality increases because of
decreasing returns to the effort expended. Note that the benefits to an individual consumer of
demanding different terms are very small because the standard form contract is unlikely to be
changed for a single transaction. Nonetheless, it is plausible that a purchaser might express a
preference at low cost and that these preferences would be reflected in an updated contract if
they were expressed sufficiently consistently. See Priest, supra note 25, who argues more
strongly that the warranties terms for consumer products are optimal, but in the context of an
environment with much greater selection pressures.
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fashioned by the courts. While the Warranty Corporations may not be
forced by competitive pressures to arrive at the optimal warranty, they
have as much incentive as the courts to attempt to fashion the optimal
contract, because once the purchaser is aware of the existence of the
warranty and has her attention drawn to it, a better warranty makes the
property more attractive. And while the Warranty Programs do not have
complete information, they have far more information about the industry
structure and costs than do the courts. Thus both the Warranty Corpora-
tions and the courts are likely to try to write the best warranty, but the
Corporations have more information on which to base their attempt.
2. The Substantive Warranty Terms
Even though the rational ignorance problem is largely overcome for
homes covered by the Warranty Program, and assuming that the War-
ranty Programs do try, at least weakly, to develop a warranty which is
attractive to purchasers, irrational decision making is still a concern. If
purchasers systematically misperceive risks then the contract they re-
quest may not be in their own best interest. As noted, psychological
models of decision making do not allow us to decide this without specific
empirical study. But rather than studying the decision-making process
involved in buying home warranty protection, we can examine the
results, that is, the warranties themselves. If the protection offered by the
Warranty is obviously deficient this may indicate bargaining failure
because of irrationality by the purchaser and judicial intervention may be
justified (with the by-now standard caveat that the courts are also affected
by irrationality). This means that a more detailed examination of the
terms of the Warranty is called for in order to determine how it attempts
to achieve the goal of deterring accidents while compensating victims of
defective construction and minimizing administrative costs. In so doing
we will explore issues of more general concern, in particular the problem
of indeterminacy in recovery for pure economic loss and the reasonable
discoverability rule for the running of limitations periods in tort.
A first point to note is that while the Warranty Program ultimately
guarantees that the Warranty will be satisfied, the liability imposed by the
warranty nonetheless provides strong incentives to the builder to take
care in building. This is because the builder is typically primarily liable
under the terms of the Warranty, with the Warranty Program providing
only a guarantee if the builder does not satisfy its obligations. Further,
builders who have poor records will eventually be expelled from the
Program and, in some jurisdictions, will pay higher premiums to enroll
their houses.
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The Warranty expressly extends to subsequent purchasers.57 This is
significant because it shows that in fact, and not just in principle, the
contractual chain between the builder and a subsequent purchaser is
sufficiently short that encouraging a contractually based solution is a
feasible approach for the courts to take. In this respect the warranty is as
favourable to the buyer as tort law.
The main barrier to extending recovery for pure economic loss has
been the courts' long-standing concern with the spectre of "liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class."58 In Bird the Court responded to this concern by noting that
liability would be limited to a defined class of persons (namely the
inhabitants of the building), for a limited period (the life of the building)
and for a limited amount (the cost of repairs). The Warranty coverage
addresses all of these considerations directly. The Warranty provides
coverage of "major structural defects" for a term of five years, and
coverage of other latent defects in materials and workmanship for a term
of one year, up to a specified dollar limit.59 Harm to persons or other
property is expressly excluded. 6 As compared to tort recovery, the
Warranty coverage is both more 'determinate' and more restricted in
scope. In order to assess whether the coverage offered by the Warranty
presents a better trade-off than that available through tort law we need to
explore the functions of the Warranty limitations in more detail.
The underlying reasons for the courts' concern regarding indetermi-
nate liability have rarely been clearly articulated. La Forest J.'s position
in his decision in CNR v. NorskPacific Steamship Co., that indeterminacy
is a concern because it may increase the cost of insurance, was a
significant step forward in this regard.6' The intuition behind this asser-
tion is evidently that just as a riskier investment demands a higher rate of
return, a riskier insurance exposure demands higher premiums. But this
57. B.C. cl. 5; Alta. cl. 8; Sask. cl. 4.5; Man. cl. 14; Que. (APCHQ) cl. 2.1.3; Atlantic
Clause 10. The Ontario statutory warranty applies directly to the home rather than to the
purchaser.
58. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1931) per Cardozo
C.J. at 444, quoted in Bird, supra note 3 at 124; in Norsk, supra note 1 at 1137 per McLachlin J.
59. B.C. cl. 2(c) and 3(c); Alta. cl. 2(b), 3(b); Sask. cl. 2.2, 2.3; Man. 3, 8; Que. (APCHQ)
cl. 2.1.2,2.1.3; Atlantic cl. 2(b),6. The Ontario coverage is two years for materials and
workmanship, and water penetration (Reg. 892 ss. 14,15(3)), and seven years for major
structural defects (Reg 892, s. 16).
60. B.C. cl. 6(d); Alta. cl. 6(c); Sask. cl. 4.3; Man. cl. 10; Ont. Reg 892, s. 6(6); Que.
(APCHQ) cl. 3.1; Atlantic cl. 8.
61. "Estimating liability is, of course, a key aspect to the pricing of insurance for potential
tortfeasors." Norsk, supra note I at 1105 and see the discussion in Part IV of his decision,
especially at 1116-25.
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intuition needs to be made more precise. "Indeterminacy" in insurance
can refer either to variability in the size of individual claims (the variance
or standard deviation of the claims distribution, to use more technical
language) or uncertainty in the size of the average claim (uncertainty in
the mean of the distribution). 62 These types of uncertainty are distinct
because given a sufficiently large statistical base, the average claim may
be well defined even though the size of any individual claim is highly
variable. It appears that in raising the issue of indeterminacy in the context
of increased recovery for pure economic loss, the courts are concerned
with variability in the size of individual claims, as allowing recovery for
pure economic loss will increase the range of claims by pushing up the
size of the top awards.63 But the theory and practice of insurance pricing
indicate that it is uncertainty in the mean of the distribution which has the
most significant effect on the price and availability of insurance. In-
creased variance of the distribution will be important only in unusual
circumstances.
Consider first the effect of increased uncertainty on the size of
individual claims. Insurance reduces risks by pooling, but in principle the
uncertainty cannot be eliminated for any finite pool of risks. In a simple
model, with normally distributed uncorrelated claims, the reserve per
exposure unit required to maintain a given risk of ruin (i.e. the risk that
the reserve will not be sufficient to satisfy all the claims) increases with
the variability of the claims, and decreases as the number of exposure
units increases (because more units allow greater statistical predictabil-
ity). 64 But in practice the effect of increased variability of individual
claims is likely to be very small. In the first place, the reserve per claim
is small. For example, if there are 10,000 exposure units, and the standard
deviation of the claims distribution is equal to the mean, a reserve equal
to about 2.5 % of the expected average claim is sufficient to maintain a risk
62. Sometimes "indeterminacy" seems to be used to refer to a claim which is potentially very
large. This can be very misleading. The fact that the average loss resulting from a certain type
of activity is very large is no reason to deny liability, since this means the activity is very
harmful. While the distinction between large and indeterminate losses is clear in principle, it
may be confusing in practice. For example, a change in tort law which introduces the potential
for a few very large claims will increase the variability of individual claims and the size of the
average claim. The uncertainty of the average claim will also increase, since time is needed to
develop a statistical basis for predicting future claims after a change in the law.
63. The size of the average claim will of course also increase, and this will lead to an increase
in premiums, but this is good or bad depending on whether the increased recovery serves the
goals of deterrence and compensation.
64. More precisely, the required reserve per unit is proportional to the variance of the claims
distribution and inversely proportional to the square root of the number of exposure units: see
J.D. Cummins, "Insurer's Risk: A Restatement" (1974) 41 J. Risk & Ins. 147 for an explanation
of the basic model.
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of ruin of 1 %.65 In other words, even if the reserve had to be established
anew every year out of premium income, the "risk premium" would only
be about 3 % of the total premium. But the reserve is not established anew
each year out of premium income. Rather it is rather built up by raising
outside equity, or by retained earnings over a period of time. Once the
reserve is built up, the cost of maintaining the reserve, which is ultimately
passed on to policyholders, is the cost of that capital. So, if the standard
deviation doubled so that the reserve requirement increased by 3%, the
increased annual premium would not be 3%, but simply the interest on
that extra amount. At an interest rate of say, 15%, that would be only an
extra 0.5 % on top of the premium. Further, the policy holder does not need
to pay even the entire interest on the extra reserve, as the insurer will
invest the reserve. The extra cost which flows through to the policy holder
is only the difference between the interest rate earned by the insurance
company and the rate of return which could be earned on the same capital
by the policy holder or investor.66 This may be significant, since insurers
generally invest very conservatively, but the extra investment income
could well cover half the cost of the capital. So, in the simple example I
have given, if the standard deviation of the claims doubled, an insurer
who wished to maintain a 1% risk of ruin would only need to increase
premiums by at most 0.25%.67
Increased variance in individual claims may be important in some
instances. If the size of the market is small, and the insurer is small and
specialized and so cannot pool risks across lines, a larger claims variance
may significantly increase reserve requirements, since the required
reserve is inversely related to the number of exposure units. Increased
indeterminacy of individual claims may also have an impact on the
availability of insurance when the increased indeterminacy results from
the addition of a group of high-risk insureds to the pool. If this group
65. Ibid. at 150.
66. Further, we need to look not just at the cost of the particular type of insurance which is
most salient in the case at hand, but at the overall insurance costs of those who are likely to be
victims. Expanded coverage of one type of insurance, e.g. builder's liability, increases the
indeterminacy and thus the premiums for that type of insurance, but may reduce the
indeterminacy and the premiums for another type of insurance (or equivalently, reduce the risk
from being entirely uninsured for a given type of loss). The net effect is important to the insured,
and not just the increase or decrease in premiums for one particular type of insurance. It is not
possible to generalize about the net effect on indeterminacy resulting from increased recovery
for pure economic loss.
67. A 1% risk of ruin may be on the high side, and the assumption that the mean equals the
standard deviation is not necessarily realistic for any particular type of loss (although in home
warranty claims it probably overestimates the risk), but the important point is that the manner
in which the reserve is financed greatly reduces the impact of increased claims variance on
insurance premiums.
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cannot be separately identified, premiums for the group as a whole will
increase, and low-risk insureds will have to pay premiums which do not
reflect their risk. This may result in "unravelling" of the risk pool as low-
risk insureds drop out entirely. This is not really a problem of indetermi-
nacy in the claim distribution, but rather a problem of proper categoriza-
tion of risks. It is a particular problem in third-party liability insurance.68
Uncertainty in the average claim, on the other hand, is very important
to insurance pricing and availability. The previous discussion of financ-
ing of the risk reserve considered a static analysis, that is, what risk
premium is required in the steady state to maintain adequate reserves.
Insurance cycles generally, and many aspects of the insurance crisis of the
mid-1980s in particular, such as drastically increased prices and the
unavailability of some types of insurance, are best explained as being due
to capacity constraints in the insurance industry resulting from capital
market imperfections.69 Internal capital is less expensive than tapping the
stock market as a means of building up the reserves necessary to support
underwriting. As a result, if a shock to the market depletes reserves,
premiums will rise and underwriting will be curtailed so that excess
profits can rebuild the reserves.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, a market with high claims variability is no
more likely than a market with low claims variability to suffer shocks,
since a market with higher claims variability will in general have a
correspondingly higher reserve. Bad years which deplete the reserves are
likely to happen with equal frequency in either type of market. Rather,
shocks to the market result primarily from uncertainty in average claims.
If an insurer has underestimated its average claim, reserves can soon be
depleted, since high losses in a bad year will not be compensated for by
surpluses in a good year. The difference between the estimated mean loss
68. See G.L. Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law" (1987) 96 Yale L.J.
1521.
69. Part of the reason for price increase for liability insurance was simply due to expanding
tort liability (see P. Danzon, "The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims:
New Evidence" (1986) 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 57 and S. Harrington & R. Litan, "Causes
of the Liability Insurance Crisis" (1988) 239 Science 737) but many specific aspects of the
crisis can only or best be explained by the capacity constraint theory, which is developed in
R.A. Winter, "The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets" (1994) 3 J. Fin. Intermedia-
tion 379; R.A. Winter, "The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance
Markets" (1988) 5 Yale J. on Reg. 455; A. Gron, "Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-
Casualty Insurance Markets" (1994) 25 RAND J. Econ. 110; A. Gron, "Evidence of Capacity
Constraints in Insurance Markets" (1994) 37 J. Law & Econ. 349. A relatively accessible
discussion is found in R.A. Winter, "The Liability Insurance Market" (1991) 5 J. Econ.
Perspectives 115; and see G. Niehaus & A. Terry, "Evidence on the Time Series Properties of
Insurance Premiums and Causes of the Underwriting Cycle: New Support for the Capital
Market Imperfection Hypothesis" (1993) 60 J. Risk & Ins. 466.
The Choice Between Implied Warranty and Tort Liability
and the actual mean loss represents a direct net reduction in the insurer's
reserves.
There are a number of sources of uncertainty in the average claim size.
New products or technologies may have uncertain average claims simply
because the claims history is not long enough to build up a good statistical
understanding of the risk. While this uncertainty is transitional in the
sense that eventually a statistical base for assessing the risk will be built
up, for products which have 'long-tail' risks, the transitional phase may
last for decades. Uncertainty regarding inflation also affects average
claims. But the source of uncertainty which is most relevant to tort law is
"socio-legal" risk, that is, uncertainty in the state of the tort law or
insurance law which causes a correlated increase in claims. Thus, it is not
the increased range in the size of claims resulting from increased recovery
for pure economic loss which is most troublesome, but the uncertainty
engendered by the changing state of the law. In short, the court can best
promote the affordability and availability of insurance by ensuring
stability in the law.7"
To return to the warranty programs in particular, the dollar limit on the
Corporation's liability is primarily determined by actuarial reserve
requirements, and illustrates some of these issues. Since it takes time to
build up adequate reserves, and the reserves are established by enrollment
fees, the cap in all jurisdictions was initially relatively low, $20,000, in
order that the initial fees could be set at reasonable levels. Typically as the
program matures and adequate reserves are built up, the cap increases to
cover the full market value of the home."l However, as noted, a jurisdic-
tion with fewer units covered is inherently riskier than a jurisdiction with
many units. Even in the smaller jurisdictions, the numbers are probably
sufficiently large that the small numbers problem would not be severe,
except that claims may be significantly correlated. In particular, claims
from a large number of units in a single poorly constructed subdivision,
or from increased exposure when a large builder fails, are major sources
of correlated risk for the Warranty Corporations. This means that at a
given cap on liability, small jurisdictions require higher reserves to
70. See M. Trebilcock, "The Social Insurance Dilemma of Modem North American Tort
Law" (1987) 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929 detailing the sources of socio-legal risk in the United
States which contributed to the insurance crisis. Trebilcock argues that one reason for an
insurance crisis in Canada which mirrored that in the United Stated in some respects, despite
significant differences in our tort law, is an insurer expectation that our tort system would
converge with that in the U.S.
71. In Quebec the APCHQ covers the full amount of the price of the house, to a limit of
$200,000 (unless a higher limit is approved). Other jurisdictions cap liability below the price
of many houses. The current limits are: B.C. $100,000; Alta. $60,000; Sask. $20,000;
Man. $30,000; Ont. $100,000; Atlantic $30,000.
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maintain the same risk of ruin as larger jurisdictions. This makes it more
difficult for small Warranty Corporations to build up adequate reserves
while charging reasonable premiums. As a consequence, liability caps
tend to be lower in smaller jurisdictions.
From this we can see that caps on liability plausibly benefit the
purchaser. The ability to recover the full market value of the home in a tort
claim is valuable only to the extent that the builder is able to satisfy the
claim. But to have an equity cushion available with which to satisfy a
claim is itself a cost, which must be passed on to the purchaser. The size
of the equity cushion which a builder requires is determined by exactly
the same principles that determine the reserve which a Warranty Corpo-
ration needs to maintain a given risk of ruin. In effect, the higher limits
under a tort claim are beneficial only if the builder has self-insured against
any claims. But self-insurance is more expensive than pooled insurance
because, as we have just seen, an insurer with fewer exposure units needs
larger reserves for a given risk of ruin. So, if tort liability allows actual
recovery of claims in excess of the cap under the Warranty, this results in
higher costs which are passed on to the purchaser. Again, on a compara-
tive cost-benefit analysis, it is entirely plausible that the Warranty
provides a better deal. In any event, in practice, claims which are
significantly above the limits are rare, and if they do occur, are likely to
bankrupt the builder, particularly if the builder has systematically en-
gaged in a poor practice.
But as noted, the concerns over indeterminacy which La Forest J.
raised in Bird are addressed primarily at uncertainty in individual claims.
While this uncertainty can have a significant effect on premiums in
smaller jurisdictions, where the risk pool is small, it does not explain why
larger jurisdictions, which have raised the dollar cap on claims, retain a
strict contractual claims period and exclude liability for personal injury.
To understand these limits, we must recognize that controlling indetermi-
nacy is not the only, and perhaps not even the primary reason for these
warranty terms in question. Cardozo CJ's felicitous phrase has been
something of a red herring. The real issue, as La Forest J. pointed out in
Norsk, is loss bearing ability, that is, the cost of insurance.72 While
indeterminacy is one factor affecting the cost and availability of insur-
ance, it is by no means the only factor, or even the most important one.
72. Norsk, supra note 1 at 1161-72. La Forest J. then analyzed the insurance issue largely in
terms of indeterminacy of recovery. This was arguably appropriate on the facts in Norsk as it
may be that indeterminacy of the loss from Norsk's perspective is a significant factor.
However, other issues, in particular the ability of CN to take steps to mitigate the loss (the moral
hazard issue, in insurance terminology), were also relevant: see Siebrasse, supra note 28 at
29-34.
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From the perspective of the consumer both products liability in tort and
contractual warranties provide a form of insurance, and the same factors
which affect insurance prices will affect the implicit price of a warranty.73
Further, moral hazard, adverse selection and administrative costs are all
significant concerns in writing insurance contracts. For example, regard-
less of indeterminacy, third-party liability insurance is a more expensive
way of providing protection than first-party insurance against the same
loss, because of its higher administrative costs.74 A focus on indetermi-
nacy alone neglects these other issues, and in general it is wrong to
conclude that simply because indeterminacy of recovery is not signifi-
cantly increased by a change in tort law, insurance will not become more
expensive.
Consider the exclusion in the Warranty of liability for harm to persons.
This contractual rule is exactly the contrary of the traditional rule in tort
law, which allows recovery only for harm occurring to persons or other
property. It also conflicts with the imperative of protecting "the bodily
integrity of inhabitants of buildings" which La Forest J. emphasized in
Bird.75 But the reason for the limitation is apparent if we think of the
Warranty as providing a type of insurance. Let us assume that the average
homeowner wants insurance against both personal injury and damage to
the house such as cracked foundations. If we are concerned with minimiz-
ing the overall cost of insurance, the question is whether it is cheaper to
buy insurance against personal injury due to housing related accidents
from the New Home Warranty Corporation, or from a more conventional
disability insurer. It is probable that a disability insurer will be able to
offer insurance against personal injury more cheaply than will a building
insurer simply because it specializes in doing so. Insurance companies do
not simply provide compensation for claims but generally attempt to
minimize claims both by controlling the sources of risk and by controlling
the cost of remedying the harm after an accident occurs. Different types
of insurers become specialists in controlling different types of costs. The
New Home Warranty Corporations may and do monitor the quality of the
builders who are enrolled, disseminate information about good building
73. The strong functional similarities between warranties and insurance are widely recog-
nized in academic writing: see e.g. P.M. Danzon, "Tort Reform and the Role of Government
in Private Insurance Markets" (1984) 13 J. Legal Stud. 517; R. Epstein, "Products Liability as
an Insurance Market" (1985) 14 J. Legal Stud. 645. In some cases it may be difficult to
distinguish between a contract of insurance and a warranty: see the cases discussed in M.G.
Baer & J.A. Rendall, Cases on the Canadian Law of Insurance, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1988) at 73-76.
74. See Siebrasse, supra note 28.
75. Supra note 3 at 122.
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practices, and/or provide information to homeowners about how to
prevent deterioration of the home.76 The disability insurer, on the other
hand, has more experience in dealing with accident victims, and so can
more effectively monitor the victim's recovery and reduce excessive
claims due to incidence of malingering. The health insurer can also tailor
the amount of coverage to the particular insured, for example by selling
low-cost term insurance to individuals with medium term family respon-
sibilities. Further, the homeowner's disability insurance would undoubt-
edly continue to cover building related injuries even if the builder were
liable for defective housing causing personal injury, thus leading to the
moral hazard problems and unwarranted administrative costs of double
recovery.
Thus for reasons unrelated to indeterminacy, from a compensation
perspective separate health insurance and building insurance is probably
preferable to overlapping insurance for personal injuries due to defective
buildings. It is true that the deterrent effect of liability is diminished to the
extent that the limitations exclude claims from accident victims who
could not have taken any steps to protect themselves from injury.
However, despite occasional disasters, structural defects do not usually
pose a threat to the health of the building inhabitants, so that the additional
deterrence effect of liability to persons is unlikely to be significant.
If personal injury from dangerous buildings is relatively rare then all
of the effects on insurance costs described above will be small. This
implies that excluding liability for injury to persons is unlikely to have
much real effect on the overall cost of insurance. But the point is that there
are good reasons why a rational well informed consumer would not want
the builder's liability to extend to personal injury: by excluding builder's
liability for personal injury and buying separate personal injury insur-
ance, a homeowner can achieve the same insurance coverage while
minimizing transactions costs, thus achieving a net saving. Thus the
Warranty arguably provides optimal protection, from a social as well as
an individual perspective.77
76. All of these activities are undertaken by varying degrees by some or all of the Warranty
Corporations.
77. One might suggest that the builder should be made liable because not all homeowners are
sufficiently rational to purchase disability insurance. However, placing liability on the builder
for personal injuries will not remedy this problem to any significant degree as few personal
injuries are a result of building defects, so that those without disability insurance will remain
largely without coverage. And ultimately this line of argument leads to the conclusion that
liability should be spread as widely as possible in order that someone in the chain can be
counted on to have insurance. While this motivation no doubt lies behind much of the
expansion of tort law in recent decades, it is an extremely inefficient method of providing
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The exclusion of consequential losses is also desirable for the same
reasons: the builder is not an efficient insurer against business interrup-
tion or harm to other chattels. One argument often advanced in favour of
extending tort recovery for pure economic loss is the illogicality of
allowing recovery for consequential economic loss while denying recov-
ery for pure economic loss: the nature of the economic loss itself might
be exactly the same, and recovery is allowed in one case and denied in
another simply because in one case the negligence fortuitously led to
physical loss in addition to the economic loss. The argument I have
advanced here and elsewhere suggests that this distinction is indeed
illogical, but the problem arises because it is wrong as a matter of policy
to allow recovery of the economic loss in either case.78 If the illogicality
is to be remedied, it should be done by refusing to allow recovery of
consequential economic loss generally. I recognize that as a practical
matter recovery of consequential economic loss is too well established to
be disturbed, but we should not compound the error. To cure the
illogicality by allowing more general recovery of pure economic loss
would be to sacrifice good policy at the altar of logical neatness.
Consider next the limitation on the duration of coverage, which is
typically five years from the date of occupancy in the case of major
structural defects and one year from the date of occupancy for other
("minor") defects.79 This is more limited than the liability in tort law,
which would run for 6 years from the time the defect was reasonably
discoverable. In Bird La Forest J. stated that liability for an indeterminate
time would not be a significant concern as liability would be limited to the
life of the building at the outside, and most likely to a much shorter period.
He noted that "With the passage of time, it will become increasingly
difficult for the owners of a building to prove at trial that any deterioration
of the building is attributable to the initial negligence of the contractor and
not simply to the inevitable wear and tear suffered by every building."8
While this is quite true, it illustrates the way in which the focus on
indeterminacy has misdirected the debate. The issue is not the possibility
of proof, which does prevent open-ended or potentially infinite liability,
insurance. If universal insurance coverage is desired, it is far less expensive and more effective
to accomplish it legislatively, through a universal plan, rather than through indiscriminately
expanding tort liability.
78. See Siebrasse, supra note 28 at 22ff for a discussion of insurance and consequential loss.
79. B.C., Alberta and Saskatchewan allow the buyer the option of purchasing an additional
five years' protection against major structural defects, thus extending the major defects
warranty to a total of ten years. In Ontario the protection against major structural defects is
seven years (Reg. 892, s. 16).
80. Supra note 3 at 126.
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as La Forest J. argues. The problem is excessive cost of proof of
negligence or lack thereof. If the administrative costs associated with a
given claim increase as time passes, then at some point the cost of shifting
additional risk to the builder becomes larger than the cost to the home-
owner of bearing the risk herself, even when the possibility of decreased
incentives to build carefully is taken into account. If the courts were
consistently entirely accurate in their determination of the cause of the
defect, and plaintiffs with unfounded claims bore all of the builder's
litigation expenses, and builders could themselves consistently accu-
rately identify valid claims and settle them without litigation, then
allowing recovery for an unlimited period while requiring proof of
causation would not increase insurance costs. If, as seems likely, not all
of these conditions are satisfied then the cost of litigation and settling
invalid claims will be passed on to all home buyers through increased
prices. A strict time limitation which bars claims arising after consider-
able time has passed whether or not they were discoverable, reduces these
costs by barring the claims which are most likely to be costly to litigate.
This argument is perhaps more intuitively obvious in the context of
personal property. Should the purchaser of a used car be able to sue the
manufacturer in tort for the cost of replacing the transmission six months
after the express major components warranty expires? The answer must
be no. Under La Forest J.'s analysis, the mechanism for rejecting such
claims is the difficulty which the plaintiff would have in proving
negligence after the warranty period expires. This mechanism would
evidently be costly. It is apparent that a strict time limit could be beneficial
to both parties in reducing these costs, and so reducing the cost of the car
in the first place.8'
81. In City of Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 the Supreme Court held that the
limitation period begins to run in tort when the damage is reasonably discoverable, rather than
when the damage occurred. The latter rule was rejected because of the "injustice of a law which
statute-bars a claim before the plaintiff is even aware of its existence" (at 36). The argument
made in the text suggests that this point is not entirely persuasive. The fact that a limitation
period running from the date of performance may, in some specific cases, statute-bar a claim
before the plaintiff is aware of its existence, does not imply that the rule is undesirable, since
a strict cut-off will lower litigation costs, and so, indirectly, the cost of the service in question.
Whether the reduced cost outweighs the unfairness in individual cases (that is, whether a well-
informed purchaser would choose a strict cut-off over a reasonable discoverability rule in
return for a price reduction) depends in part on the proportion of true defects which will
normally be detected before the expiry of the limitation period. A strict cut-off which
nonetheless encompasses the great majority of defects may be desirable even if it unfairly
makes recovery impossible in some cases. This is of course very context dependent, so that it
is difficult to say whether the use of the general discoverability rule in tort law generally is
desirable. However, the matter is not so clear cut as the Court in Kamloops indicated.
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While the case for a strict cut-off of claims is a strong one, whether the
particular claims period in the warranty is optimal is a separate question.
A strict limitation period does cut off some legitimate claims and so shifts
some of the risk to the buyer. But the risk that the buyer bears may be quite
small and more than compensated for by the reduced cost if the majority
of true defects will become apparent within the limitation period. An
important factor in determining the optimal claims period is therefore the
proportion of true defects which appear within that period. In the case of
minor latent defects, such as crooked hinges or a shaky bannister, the
source of the defect becomes more difficult to prove as time goes on and
most true defects will be discoverable in less than a year (in most cases
they will be discoverable almost immediately) so it is clear that a short
limitation period provides the best cost-benefit trade-off.
The trade-off is not so clear in the case of major structural defects.
Defects will not manifest themselves immediately, so a very short period
is not desirable. But neither is indefinite protection desirable. After a very
long time some cracks may be expected in even well-constructed foun-
dations because of inevitable subsidence, and in some cases flaws may
arise because of failure by the buyer to notice and take preventative
measures against problems such as excessive water build-up and freezing
against the foundations. Some intermediate term of protection is probably
best, but empirical information is needed to set an optimal term. That
information is not presently available for Canada, as the Warranty
Corporations have kept track of defects only during the period of
warranty coverage, that is, five years, or seven years in Ontario.8 2
Evidence from England, in which a warranty program with a ten year
claims period has been in operation since 1936, indicates that 70% of
claims are made within the last three years of the ten year warranty period.
The American experience is apparently similar.83 Further, the claims
profile typically rises steadily through the third, fourth and fifth years
before leveling off.' Given this pattern, it seems unlikely that claims will
suddenly drop off in the sixth year. Between the international experience
82. The failure of the Warranty Corporations to collect the more extensive information
necessary to determine the optimal claims period is itself a sign of market failure. This
behaviour is not due entirely to the weak competitive pressures in the home warranty market,
as a very similar behaviour is exhibited by automobile insurers, who, despite a competitive
market, failed to collect the information needed to ensure their insurance rating categories were
optimal, or even rational: see Zurich Insurance. Co. v. Ontario Human Rights Commission
(1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 346 (S.C.C.). There is probably a significant free-rider problem in
collecting this information.
83. Michael Hall, Deputy Chief Executive of National House Building Council, personal
communication with the author.
84. Ibid.
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and the claims profile in Canada in the first five years, it seems likely that
a significant number of defects would be discoverable after the fifth year.
This indicates that a strict five year limitation is not optimal from the
purchaser's perspective. However, we must keep in mind the need for a
comparative analysis: while a strict five year cut-off may not be optimal,
a tort rule of six years from reasonable discoverability certainly is not, and
is very likely worse. Further, while the competitive pressures in the home
warranty industry are weak, change does occur as new information
surfaces. In large part because of the English experience, albeit indirectly,
Warranty Programs in three jurisdictions now offer an optimal extra five
years protection for an additional fee.85 So, the limitation period offered
by the Warranty Programs may evolve towards optimality, whereas the
tort law is fixed at a non-optimal duration.
The Warranty provides for strict liability for specified defects. This is
perhaps not surprising, but it is nonetheless significant. Strict liability is
obviously more advantageous to the buyer than is liability for negligence
in tort. While it is commonplace in contractual warranties, it is not
inevitable, as a "best efforts" warranty is possible. That the warranty
provides for strict liability indicates that it is not just a marketing ploy
which takes away in the fine print what it promises in the bold type. Strict
liability is substantively preferable in these circumstances because it has
lower administrative costs than a negligence standard, and the cap on
claim amounts and the limitation on the period during which claims can
be made provide sufficient incentives for the homeowner to maintain the
building properly.
Finally, the warranty covers neither patent defects (defined, as at
common law, as defects which could have been discovered by a reason-
ably prudent inspection) nor defects which are not preventible by the
builder, such as defects in material supplied by the purchaser, normal
85. B.C., Alberta and Saskatchewan offer extended warranty coverage for an additional fee
ranging from $140 to $280. The extended warranty is not particularly popular, with roughly
15-20% of homeowners electing to purchase it. Of course, the purchasers have even less
knowledge than the builders about the rate of defects appearing in the second five-year period,
so the low rate of purchase of the extended warranty cannot be taken to mean the extended
warranty is not desirable. Rational ignorance and irrationality no doubt dominate decision
making on the point. Alberta has offered an extended warranty since 1986, and has had no
claims to date. However, the statistical base is still very small: even if claims rates in the second
five-year period continued the plateau observed in the final year of the first five-year coverage,
actuarial projections would suggest that perhaps twenty claims would have been observed. The
fact that no claims at all have been observed may be explained by lack of consumer awareness.
Apparently in the early years in which American firms offered an extended warranty very few
claims were reported, but as consumer awareness increased (especially among subsequent
purchasers) the claim rate in the extended period rose dramatically: Michael Hall, personal
communication with the author.
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cracks in paint or drywall, damage resulting from normal wear and tear,
or inadequate or improper maintenance, defects resulting from an act of
God or a third party, and damage caused by the purchaser or their agents.
These limitations reflect tort doctrines and serve variously to absolve the
builder of liability which it could not prevent, and to ensure that the
purchaser has adequate incentive to avoid causing harm himself.
IV. The Implications of Extended Tort Liability
The preceding discussion was not an attempt to show directly that the
warranty terms offered by the Warranty Corporations across the country
are in fact optimal: the detailed information required to determine the
optimal contract is as far beyond my reach as it is beyond the reach of the
courts. Rather I argued the Warranty companies have an incentive to offer
optimal terms, that they have more relevant information than the courts,
and that an examination of the terms actually offered represent a careful
balancing of risks and costs which is plausibly superior to that which
could be offered by tort law once it is recognized that a trade-off must be
made between protection and cost, as increased costs due to increased tort
liability will ultimately be passed back to the buyer. Although it is
probable that both rational ignorance and irrationality in decision making
mean that the Warranty is not optimal, the failure of the bargaining
process is not so egregious as to justifyjudicial intervention. From this we
may conclude that from the point of view of the homeowner the protec-
tion offered by the Warranties represents a better trade-off between
protection and cost than does protection which could be offered by the
courts through tort law. A judicial extension of liability beyond the
Warranty could be justified as being in the interest of the buyer only if the
courts are willing to make a number of specific factual assumptions on
matters about which the builders are much better informed than the
courts.
It follows that extension of liability in tort will be detrimental to home
buyers who are now covered by the Warranty program (which is the
majority of residential home buyers) because it would impede the ability
of the parties to allocate risk more efficiently than can the courts. If
liability is imposed in tort, then the builder and initial purchaser can of
course modify their tort obligations through contract, but subsequent
purchasers will not be bound by this agreement. The builder might insure
against this increased liability (most probably through the New Home
Warranty Corporation which already has a quality monitoring system in
place and which could therefore provide the lowest cost insurance), but
these increased insurance costs would be passed on to the buyers, and
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indirectly, to the subsequent purchaser. Since, on the argument developed
above, the protection currently offered to the homeowners (including
subsequent homeowners) through the Warranty program is closer to the
optimum than is tort protection, the value to the homeowner of the
additional judicially imposed protection would be less than the increased
cost of housing.86
The same argument applies to cases involving sophisticated commer-
cial buyers and builders. As we have already seen, there is every reason
to think that they are fully capable of deciding their own best interest, so
at best there will be no gains from extended liability as the parties contract
around the tort rule. It is true that even sophisticated parties are not always
perfectly rational, and in some instances mistakes may be made. How-
ever, where both parties are sophisticated, the mistakes are as likely to be
made by either side, so there are no obvious gains to be had from shifting
the presumptive liability: all that could be accomplished is that in the
future, buyers will have a windfall when the seller makes a mistake, rather
than conversely as was the case before Bird. Since neither side is more or
less likely to make mistakes, there are no net gains.
If liability were extended in tort the parties might attempt to contract
back to the optimal position by a condition that the initial purchaser would
agree to include a limitation of builder's liability clause in any sale to a
subsequent purchaser and agree to indemnify the builder for any losses
resulting from its failure to do so. While this mechanism could be used to
allocate risk despite extended liability in tort it would be more expensive
than the current warranty which benefits subsequent purchasers. The
builder would have to increase the price of the protection it offered to
account for the risk that the indemnification agreement would be worth-
less because the initial purchaser was judgment proof. More importantly,
this scheme would expose a solvent initial purchaser to a serious risk in
the case that he failed to include the limitation of liability clause in the
subsequent sale agreement. This risk may be overlooked because of
rational ignorance and irrationality: if we are willing to impose tort
liability because of such concerns, then we should probably also declare
such clauses unconscionable. To the extent that claims resulting from
failure to include a limitation of liability clause were covered by the
malpractice insurance of the lawyer handling the sale for the initial
purchaser, the price charged would increase to account for the additional
transaction costs associated with this indirect form of insurance.
86. Builders might choose to carry the risk of extra exposure themselves rather than purchase
insurance. This would also lead to higher cost housing as it would increase the riskiness of the
enterprise, and builders would demand a greater return to compensate for the extra risk. Again,
the increased price would not be worth the increased protection.
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But even if extended builders' liability cannot be justified in respect of
sophisticated purchasers of commercial property or purchasers of homes
covered by the Warranty Program this leaves two significant groups who
may be insufficiently protected. The Warranty programs cover essen-
tially only residential construction,8" and while many commercial buyers
are sufficiently sophisticated to protect themselves, some may not be.18
Further, as noted earlier, a significant number of new homes are not
covered by a New Home Warranty Plan. Homes not covered are primarily
owner constructed homes and homes built by small-scale builders who
build only infrequently. Whether or not such small scale builders are
aware of the benefits of offering warranty protection by joining the
Warranty Company they are typically not eligible to join, as the Corpo-
rations impose standards for membership, including financial stability
and/or experience in the building trade. In either of these cases, the
problems of bounded rationality again suggest that buyers may fail to
adequately protect themselves. If this is the case, then it might be
suggested that extending tort liability will benefit these groups suffi-
ciently to outweigh the harm to groups which are currently protected by
private warranty or other means such as first-party insurance or self-
insurance, particularly if the more sophisticated groups can minimize the
cost increases due to tort liability through the suggested mechanism of
indemnification agreements.
There are several problems with this argument in the context of
dealings between small builders who are not presently members of the
Corporation and residential home buyers. In the first place, it is not clear
whether the optimal contract would provide for builder's liability. In the
case of a warranty issued through the Warranty Corporation, the value of
the warranty is simply equal to the expected loss (the probability of a
defect multiplied by the cost of rectifying it). A warranty by a small
builder is worth less than this to the buyer, because of the significant
likelihood that the builder would not be financially able to carry out the
repairs or to satisfy a judgment against him. In other words, the value to
the buyer of the warranty will be discounted by the not insignificant
probability that the builder will be impecunious.89 At the same time,
87. The New Home Warranty Corp. of B.C. covers some split residential/commercial
buildings, e.g. a comer store with a residence above.
88. For completeness, the category of unsophisticated commercial buyers buying from
unsophisticated commercial builders should be considered. This is unlikely to be a large
category, and in any event the arguments parallel those of the residential builders buying from
non-member builders.
89. The turnover rate among smaller builders is very high: the New Home Warranty
Corporation of British Columbia reports an 80% mortality rate over three years. The Atlantic
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because the legal system is costly, prone to delay and subject to judicial
error, the parties may prefer an informal warranty, where the builder
agrees implicitly or explicitly to repair any defects which become
apparent, thereby avoiding the expense of relying on the formal legal
system. The purchaser would rely on the builder's reputation rather than
a formal legal guarantee to ensure that defects are repaired.' Parties
might choose to rely on a smaller builder's reputation while requiring a
warranty from a larger builder for two reasons. First, on the deterrence
side, a smaller builder is often a member of the local community in which
the home is built, in which case reputation would be relatively easy to
verify, and loss of a good reputation is a strong sanction.
At the same time, from the point of view of compensation, a small
builder, often one or two individuals, will be roughly as risk averse as the
home buyer, so there are no gains to be had from shifting the risk from the
purchaser to the builder. This means that the compensation rationale for
a warranty is weak. The deterrent effect of the warranty may also be weak.
In the first place, even if the optimal contract would have a warranty
provision, tort liability to the same effect will not necessarily have any
effect if the builder is unsophisticated, since increased liability does not
increase the incentive to work carefully unless the builder is aware of his
or her increased exposure. And even if the builder is aware of the law, an
individual builder is as subject to "irrational" risk assessment as the
purchaser. A large builder may have had sufficient experience to have a
good statistical idea of its potential exposure, and will likely have been
involved in some defective construction, thus increasing the salience of
the possibility of a building defect. A small builder, without this breadth
of experience, is much more likely to be over-optimistic about the chance
of a defect. In other words, the builders who are least likely to be enrolled
in the warranty program are those who are also least likely to be
influenced to take extra care in construction by the prospect of liability in
tort.
New Home Warranty Corporation has 970 current members and has a total of approximately
3000 members since it inception, and has only 27 members who have been members for the
entire twenty years of its existence. As noted earlier, under the Warranty Program the Warranty
Corporation guarantees the satisfaction of the Warranty terms if the builder does not carry out
its obligations, so eliminating the risk of ajudgment proof defendant which the purchaser faces
when dealing with a small builder.
90. See L. Bernstein, "Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms" (1996) 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 who notes (at 1790-91) that in
order to avoid the costs of the legal system computer software manufacturers often disclaim
all warranties in a shrink-wrap agreement, but in practice are willing to satisfy reasonable
complaints.
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It might be suggested that even if tort liability will not induce extra care
in such a case, it may at least prevent a builder from deliberately cutting
corners to reduce cost. A warranty is one response to this problem, but
given the problems with enforcing a warranty in court, a purchaser may
rationally choose to rely on the builder's reputation instead. In sum, a
warranty provided by a small builder may not be very valuable, either for
deterrence nor the compensation purposes, and given the transaction
costs associated with a formal warranty, a purchaser might rationally
choose to rely on the builder's reputation to give the incentives which
might otherwise be provided by a warranty. Even though the purchaser
may ultimately regret such a choice in some cases, it is not necessarily
irrational for the buyer to agree not to require a warranty in return for a
lower price.
In dealings between two unsophisticated parties, both parties may be
unaware of the precise legal rules, in which case the price paid for the
home will reflect the understanding by the parties of the allocation of risk.
This understanding may not change even if the legal rules change. If
neither the deterrence or compensation functions of tort law are likely to
be well served by extending liability, the best rule is one which accords
with the understanding of the parties. This will at least prevent windfall
gains or losses. It is not obvious that the implicit understanding includes
builders' liability, particularly since it is not clear that the optimal risk
allocation includes builders' liability. While caveat emptor seems counter-
intuitive, the buyer no doubt realizes that purchasing a home from a small
builder is a riskier proposition than buying one from an established
builder, if only because of the possibility of the builder being unable to
satisfy a claim. Further, as noted earlier, information from real estate
agents about homes which are covered by a Warranty Program may alert
the purchaser to the fact that the home which he ultimately buys is not
covered. Thus it seems unlikely that caveat emptor leads to systematic
windfalls to the builders, and it is possible that extended liability would
result in windfalls to the purchaser.
This is not to argue that we can conclude firmly that there are no gains
to be had from extending tort liability in the context of unsophisticated
builders and residential home owners, although this may be the case. My
main point is that the potential gains are significantly more limited than
a more simplistic analysis suggests.
Finally, the effect of extended tort liability on transactions involving
sophisticated commercial builders and unsophisticated buyers is also
uncertain. On the one hand unsophisticated buyers may be taken advan-
tage of by sellers, as the simple story suggests, but on the other hand we
have seen that builders have incentives to advertise their warranty to
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unsophisticated builders, and this and reputation effects may lead to
protection of even unsophisticated commercial buyers.
In summary, while there are very probably at least some parties who
do not now receive the protection they would have desired because of the
problem of bounded rationality, these parties do not form an identifiable
class, and may be relatively few in number. On the other hand, we know
that in the majority of cases, namely sophisticated commercial purchasers
and residential purchaser now covered by a Warranty Program, extending
liability in tort will be detrimental to the purchaser. The case for extending
tort liability is therefore far from compelling.
V. Implied Warranty
1. Rational Ignorance
The prospect of imposing liability in tort gives rise to a dichotomous
choice between leaving some groups unprotected and judicially disrupt-
ing the satisfactory arrangements of other groups. This dichotomy is
unwarranted: it arises because the tort model views imposing judicial
solutions as the only approach to remedying imperfect bargaining.
Another option is to impose liability which can be modified by contract,
in particular an implied third-party beneficiary warranty. The functional
significance of this approach is that modification of the implied warranty
by an express warranty would in principle be binding, even with respect
to third parties, because the third-party rights derive from the warranty. 9'
(It is possible that such a result could be arrived at through a tort analysis
but for clarity of discussion I will, for now, assume that contractual
modification of tort liability would not be binding on a third party.)
An initial reaction to this suggestion might be that the builder will just
disclaim the implied warranty. This misses the point of the earlier
discussion of rational ignorance. If the purchaser is willing to pay more
for the warranty than it costs to provide it, then the builder has every
incentive to provide the warranty and make a profit from doing so. If the
buyer is not willing to pay as much as the warranty costs, then it is not
desirable. The problem arises when, because of rational ignorance, a
91. This is not to say that all disclaimers would necessarily be binding: the circumstances in
which the disclaimer is made would certainly be relevant, as they are now in sale of goods law.
Refusing to recognize a disclaimer is justified when there is reason to believe the bargaining
process has failed and that the courts can impose a better solution. This raises the same issues
that were discussed in the text in the context of the choice between imposing initial liability in
tort or contract, except that the relevant consideration will be applied to the specific facts of the
disclaimer.
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buyer mistakenly believes that she is getting a warranty, in which case the
seller can charge a price commensurate with warranty protection without
actually providing it. An implied warranty addresses this problem by
increasing the availability of warranty information. In other words, this
approach adopts the strategy of using background rules to encourage
bargaining.
An implied warranty is clearly superior to tort liability in the case of
sophisticated commercial parties or residential purchasers of a home
covered by the Warranty Program because it does not affect their bargain.
It also offers unambiguous gains in cases in which sophisticated sellers
take advantage of unsophisticated commercial buyers by not offering
warranty protection, because it would encourage informed bargaining.
Sophisticated builders, who by definition are aware of and properly
assess their legal position, selling commercial property to unsophisti-
cated buyers would have to either expressly modify or disclaim the
implied warranty if they did not wish to remain liable. This would lower
the unsophisticated buyer's cost of discovering the governing rules of the
transaction. It is true that inserting a disclaimer of liability in the contract
is not quite the same as actively advertising a warranty, but, as discussed
above, it is not accurate to say that purchasers never read the fine print.
The likelihood that a purchaser will read and understand information
provided with the product depends on the expected usefulness of the
information and the format in which it is presented.92 In any event, we do
not need to rely solely on the purchaser reading the contract in detail. In
the case of unsophisticated parties, whether commercial or residential
buyers, it seems likely that a failure by the real estate agent or lawyer
handling the transaction to point out a disclaimer of liability would be
considered professional negligence. In contrast, failure to explain that the
existing law does not provide an implied warranty is probably not
negligence, because it is impractical to explain all relevant background
law. Further, in the American jurisdictions which have adopted an
implied warranty approach, a disclaimer which is not prominent or
clearly explained will be held not to be effective. 93
Thus the presence of an express warranty or disclaimer is likely to
significantly improve the purchaser's information. The buyer might
choose not to buy the home on discovering that it was not protected, or
might negotiate a lower price, or might decide that the risk was accept-
able. In any case, there is no unfairness. And of course if the seller chooses
92. See J.R. Bettman, J.W. Payne & R. Staelin, "Cognitive Considerations in Presenting Risk
Information" in Viscusi & Magat, supra note 36 at c. 2.
93. Jones, supra note 5 at 1069.
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not to disclaim, the parties will be in the same situation as if liability were
based in tort.
In many cases the seller will modify the implied warranty. The
modifications would be binding on the subsequent purchasers, because
their rights would be derived from the contract and the express terms
would displace the implied terms. This possibility is not unfair: on the
contrary, it is the real advantage of an implied warranty approach. The
judicially implied warranty itself will be as blunt an instrument as tort
law, and if modifications are not binding on subsequent purchasers, the
net effect will be the same as if tort liability were extended. By allowing
modifications the parties can tailor the agreement more precisely than
could be done by the courts. The Court in Bird remarked that "there is no
logical reason for allowing the contractor to rely upon a contract made
with the original owner to shield him or her from liability to subsequent
purchasers .... 94 With respect, this is not correct. Rational purchasers
contemplating selling their homes will demand good warranties in order
to improve the resale price. Slightly less rational purchasers who fail to
consider the possibility of resale will nonetheless demand a good warran-
ties to protect themselves. In either case, the original owner is a good
proxy for a subsequent purchaser. Of course, the original purchaser might
fail to demand adequate protection because of bounded rationality,
whether or not they are contemplating resale. In this case the contract
made between the original owner and the builder will not adequately
protect a subsequent purchaser, but neither will it adequately protect the
original owner. So, either the contract between the original purchaser and
the builder can be relied upon to protect both the original purchaser and
the subsequent purchaser, or it cannot be relied upon to protect either.
Either the court should intervene to protect both parties, or it can rely on
the contracting process.
This informational argument in favour of imposing liability is weakest
in the context of small scale home builders. Since these builders are
almost as likely as the purchasers to suffer from bounded rationality in
contracting, the present problem of buyers not insisting on a warranty
would simply be replaced by the problem of builders not contracting out
of liability. It is difficult to judge whether there would be any net effect.
In summary, in comparison with the present regime, tort liability
would result in net losses for transactions involving sophisticated buyers
and sellers, whereas an implied warranty regime would retain the status
quo. Tort liability would result in uncertain gains for transactions
94. Supra note 3 at 125.
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involving sophisticated builders and unsophisticated buyers, whereas an
implied warranty would result in clear gains. And both the tort and
implied warranty approaches have ambiguous effects on transactions
involving two unsophisticated parties. If these conclusions are correct
then an implied warranty approach to extended liability would be clearly
superior to extended liability in tort. The fundamental reason for this
superiority is that an implied warranty approach recognizes that asym-
metry of information may impede bargaining. By shifting the presump-
tive liability to the party with the lowest information costs, it lowers the
cost of bargaining, thus encouraging private ordering, rather than impos-
ing judicial ordering.95
2. Irrationality
An implied warranty approach may also address some of the concerns
raised by the problem of irrational decision making. As noted earlier,
some studies show that people under-estimate low probability risks of a
large loss, such as a major structural defect, while others show over
estimation of such risks. One plausible reconciliation of the evidence
suggests that the direction of the bias depends on the form in which the
choice is presented: if the risk is salient or people are forced to confront
it they may over-estimate the risk, but otherwise it may be ignored
entirely. In either case the probability of the harm is adjusted to a level
which we are cognitively equipped to recognize: in the first case, when
the risk must be addressed, its probability is estimated at a sufficiently
high level to be processed, whereas in the second case it is simply ignored
entirely.96 When the background rule is caveat emptor the default position
95. Since in Ontario builders and vendors of new homes must be registered under the Ontario
New Home Warranties Act, supra note 48 and the warranty is not disclaimable (s. 13(6)) the
Ontario approach is more akin to a tort claim than to an implied warranty as discussed in the
text, except that the terms of the protection are decided by the legislature rather than the courts.
This has two potential shortcomings which reflect arguments made in the text against tort
liability. First, some builders who, in other jurisdictions, would build without being members
of the Warranty Program, are prohibited from building in Ontario. This is detrimental to some
informed consumers who might knowingly choose to purchase from such a builder even
without warranty protection. Secondly, it does not allow the parties to modify the terms of their
agreement. However, this second point is less objectionable than in the context of tort liability.
The legislature sets the terms of the warranty by regulation, but this is with the advice of the
Corporation set up under the act to administer the Plan. This Corporation has access to the same
information and serves the same role as the private Corporations in other jurisdictions, and so
probably is equally able to set appropriate terms. Any presumption in favour of greater
efficiency of private companies is not as strong when there is no competition in the private
sector.
96. Supra note 36.
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is no protection and the purchaser is not required to consider the risk in
"deciding" not to purchase protection. On the other hand, when the
background rule is an implied warranty, a decision not to acquire
protection would require accepting a disclaimer clause in the agreement.
The presence of an express warranty or even a disclaimer clause would
require the purchaser to consider the risk actively and thus may tend to
induce an over-estimation of the risk. This increases the attractiveness of
the warranty and makes it less likely that the purchaser would accept a
disclaimer. Of course the manner in which the information is presented
will undoubtedly have a significant effect on the perceived risk. A
purchaser is more likely to value the warranty protection highly if
presented with a brochure that asks (as does the Manitoba New Home
Warranty Program brochure) "Would you make a major purchase with-
out a warranty?" and details the risks and coverage, than if the informa-
tion is presented in a passing mention of a disclaimer of liability by a real
estate agent. Again the requirement of a clear disclaimer helps address
this problem.
A different and well established psychological phenomenon is the
"endowment effect".97 The minimum amount that an individual is willing
to accept to sell something they presently own is generally significantly
more than the maximum price that they are willing to pay to acquire it. To
see how this may affect the choice of warranty protection consider the
choice between contract A, which offers a house without warranty
protection, and contract B, which offers the same house with warranty
protection at a price $350 higher than contract A. If caveat emptor is the
background rule, contract A would be silent on the issue of warranty
protection and contract B would contain an express warranty. If an
implied warranty is the background rule, contract A would have an
express disclaimer of warranty and contract B would be silent. The
endowment effect suggests that once the consumer has decided to
purchase the home, with caveat emptor as a background rule the choice
will be whether to pay $350 to acquire a warranty, whereas with an
implied warranty background rule, the decision will be whether to sell the
warranty for $350. If this characterization is correct, the endowment
effect predicts that significantly more people will choose the warranty in
the second scenario. This conclusion is tentative because, while the
endowment effect is strong and well established, it is difficult to know if
this assessment of when the warranty will be perceived as being bought
or sold is accurate.
97. See D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetch & R.H. Thaler, "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion and Status Quo Bias" (1991) 5 J. Econ. Perspectives 193.
The Choice Between Implied Warranty and Tort Liability
Finally, the "follow the leader" effect is significant in decision making
under uncertainty, for example in the adoption of new technology,98 and
in their classic study of flood insurance Kunreuther et al. found that "by
far" the most important determinants of the decision to buy insurance
were whether the person knew someone who had purchased insurance
and the perceived seriousness of the problem.99 This suggests that if
significant numbers of buyers do choose warranty protection, it will be
more difficult for builders who do not wish to offer such protection to
convince a purchaser to accept a disclaimer of liability.
As we have already noted, it is difficult to draw conclusions from
psychological studies of decision making without a specific context for
the decision-making. The foregoing discussion nonetheless suggests,
albeit tentatively, that a disclaimable implied warranty of fitness for
habitation will make it more likely that people will choose warranty
protection.
VI. Genesis of the Warranty Corporations
The greatest potential gains from an implied warranty are in cases in
which asymmetry of ignorance resulting from rational ignorance is
greatest, namely in the case of residential home buyers dealing with
sophisticated builders. Because the Warranty Corporations provide war-
ranty protection in precisely these cases, the remaining gains to be had
from extending liability in other categories of relationships are likely to
be modest. However, this should not be taken as uncritical support for the
position that judicial intervention is generally pointless because market
forces will already have arrived at the optimal result. The private New
Home Warranty Corporations did not arise spontaneously as a market
response to the inefficient common law rule of caveat emptor. Rather,
they were were all founded in the mid- 1 970s, in response to government
pressure which itself was apparently stimulated by concerns about
building quality during the housing boom of the early 1970s.'0°
98. E.M. Rogers & F.F. Shoemaker, Communication ofInnovations (New York: Free Press,
1971).
99. Supra note 35 at 130. See also supra note 97. "Follow the leader" is very plausibly a
rational strategy given limited information and costly learning: see G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg,
"Rules of Thumb for Social Learning" (1993) 101 J. Pol. Econ. 612.
100. The federal government apparently took the initiative in pressing either for industry
warranty programs or for provincial legislation, which is why the warranty programs were all
established at almost the same time. The Alberta plan was the first to be operational, set up in
1974, and the remainder, including the Ontario plan, were established two years later. In
Ontario mandatory legislation was enacted, and in British Columbia the government intro-
duced Bill 43 in 1975 which would have established a legislated warranty scheme, but the Bill
was abandoned after industry lobbying persuaded the B.C. government that an industry plan
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This might be thought to show that builders "don't care" about
providing protection and thus rebut the argument made earlier that it is in
builders' own self-interest to provide warranty protection where it is
desirable to do so. But since the New Home Warranty Corporations have
been established we have seen an expansion of liability in several
jurisdictions, both through an increase in the cap on liability and in the
length of protection available. This is inconsistent with the view that the
builders have simply reluctantly bowed to government pressure. An
alternative explanation for the late arrival of warranty programs is a
combination of bounded rationality in consumer decision making and
considerable collective action problems involved in setting up a warranty
program. Self-insurance by individual builders is not feasible, for reasons
discussed above. An insurer needs to cover a significant portion of the
market in order for there to be any real insurance. But since the construc-
tion market is very competitive all the gains from providing a desirable
warranty accrue to the home buyer and not to the builder. This means that
the builder's incentive to provide such a warranty is increased market
share rather than increased profits; but obviously not all builders can
increase their market share simultaneously. At the same time, even the
incentive to take market share from uninsured builders is minimal,
because, as we have seen, bounded rationality is likely to suppress the
demand for warranties at the time of purchase given a background rule of
caveat emptor, while at the same time once the defects become manifest
hindsight makes the warranties appear imperative. It is therefore not
surprising that the perceived public need for warranty protection arose
after a boom in the housing market. Even if the quality of housing built
in the boom was much the same as at any other time, given that many
homes were built in the same period, a larger number of homeowners
would retrospectively realize the need for a warranty at approximately the
same time, thus giving rise to a louder call for warranty protection.10 1 This
suggests that the industry as a whole will not organize to provide a
Warranty Corporation without an external impetus.
As it happened, the necessary external impetus was provided by the
threat of legislative action. I suggest the impetus could equally have come
via the courts, through imposition of liability for defective work, whether
through tort or contract. In other words the main benefit of extended
would be preferable. In other jurisdictions the threat of legislation was sufficient to induce the
builders to organize.
101. See R.G. Noll & J.E. Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation" (1990) 19 J.Legal Stud. 747 for a general discussion of the implications of
cognitive psychology for the demand for public regulation of risks.
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builders liability arguably would have been in overcoming institutional
inertia and encouraging the development of the institutional infrastruc-
ture necessary to support warranty protection. This benefit of imposing
liability will not now be realized in the specific context of new home
warranties as Warranty Corporations have arisen because of legislative
pressure, but this does not imply that judicial intervention of this type is
never justified because the market response will always be optimal.
VII. Miscellaneous
1. Defective chattels
I have argued that the desirability of tort liability depends on the details
of the market for the goods in question. I argued that in the context of real
property liability on the builder for personal injury is probably undesir-
able. The same argument does not apply in the context of personal
property for a number of reasons. Chattels are more likely than real
property to cause personal injury, and low probability risks of a serious
personal injury are precisely those types of risk which psychological
evidence indicates are most likely to be poorly assessed. 102 As important,
the arguments in favour of a disclaimable implied warranty made in this
article apply only when the parties are joined in a contractual chain.
Personal property is more likely to injure someone who is not even
indirectly linked with the manufacturer. At the same time, the deterrent
value of liability may be significant since, unlike the case with defective
structures, the exposure from a contractual liability to repair or replace the
defective product itself may often be small in relation to the exposure
from liability for personal injury."0 3 And, as discussed above, while
liability for personal injury resulting from shoddy structures is probably
not necessary or strictly desirable, it will likely have little impact on the
price or availability of housing. This suggests that while different
arguments apply to different aspects of the problem, when added together
the present regime of tort liability for personal injury and warranty
coverage for pure economic loss may be satisfactory.
Further, while the above example illustrates that the analysis in this
article is not directly applicable to personal property, extension of
warranty protection to subsequent purchasers who are not in privity is
102. But see Ramseyer, supra note 31.
103. This is a tentative suggestion, and should by no means be taken as a recommendation
that contracting out of liability for physical harm should be prohibited.
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probably desirable in the context of personal property,"° and extending
liability in tort is likely undesirable, for much the same reasons as were
given in the context of real property.105
2. Concurrency
This article began by decrying the use of tort law as a way of avoiding
contract doctrine. In a way, the suggestion that liability for defective
buildings should rest in contract is a way of using contract to avoid a
defect in tort, namely the difficulty of modifying tort liability. Ultimately
the choice should not be framed in terms of a choice between tort and
contract. If severe bargaining failure occurs, so that a judicially imposed
solution is desirable, then this should be available in contract law as well
as through tort law, or the purchaser may be at a disadvantage. More
generally, different bodies of doctrine may address the same or different
policy considerations. When the policies promoted differ, it is unobjec-
tionable if the different bodies of doctrine give different results when
applied on the same facts. 0 6 In such a case it is essential that the body of
doctrine most favourable to the plaintiff (which is the cause of action
which will inevitably be chosen) be confined strictly to its appropriate
domain, as defined by the factual circumstances of the case. On the other
hand, two bodies of doctrine may differ, not because they promote
104. In its Report on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods (1976) at
74-76 the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that the requirement of privity be
abolished in the sale of consumer goods, and this recommendation has been implemented to
at least some degree in some jurisdictions: see the discussion in G.H.L. Fridman, Sale of Goods
in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 451-54.
105. I have argued elsewhere that the bar of recovery for pure economic loss is also justified
in cases where there is no contractual link, but for quite different reasons, primarily the high
transaction costs associated with such an action: see Siebrasse, supra note 28. See also
Feldthusen & Palmer, supra note 18 noting that much pure economic loss is not a true social
loss.
106. See eg. Canson Enterprises v. Broughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 in which the issue
was the overlap between law and equity. McLachlin J. (for herself, Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux-
Dub6 J.) insisted on basing her reasoning on principles of equity, on the ground that the
principles sought to be advanced by the law of fiduciary obligations are distinct from those of
tort and contract (at 543). La Forest J. (for himself, Sopinka, Gonthier and Cory JJ.) was of the
view that equity and law have mingled and so in many cases could draw on each other, but
nonetheless conceded that when there are different policy objectives equity could and should
achieve a different result (at 586-87). A similar debate occurs in Norberg v. Wynrib, [ 1992]
2 S.C.R. 226 in which McLachlin J. (for herself and L'Heureux-Dubd J.) insisted on the
fiduciary nature of the relationship while La Forest J. (for himself, Gonthier and Cory JJ.) was
of the view that tort law principles could encompass the unequal power relationship which he
acknowledged was a significant factor in the case. This represents a debate over whether tort
law and the law of fiduciary relationships do indeed advance different underlying policies,
while acknowledging that to the extent that they do, different results may be appropriate.
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different underlying policies, but because they characteristically apply in
different circumstances. In this case it is desirable that the two bodies of
doctrine give the same result in cases in which both may apply.
10 7
Conversely, if two bodies of doctrine give different results on the same
facts, then either they address different underlying policy considerations,
and their respective spheres of application should be clearly demarcated;
or they are both addressing the same policy concerns, in which case
different results indicate that one body of doctrine, at least, is substan-
tively wrong in its application to the facts. If, as I have argued, in at least
some circumstances in which parties are not in privity, a contractual
approach should nonetheless be adopted because the parties can modify
their relationship through indirect contracting, then this result should be
available in tort as well. In other words, recovery of pure economic loss
in tort might be desirable if parties not in privity were able to modify their
obligations by indirect contracting. A step in this direction was taken by
McLachlin J. in her decision in London Drugs ° in which she held that
a contract could be part of the "concatenation of circumstances" which
could limit a defendant's duty of care in tort. Further development in this
direction would be essential if the Court were to continue to rely primarily
on tort law in contract-tort contexts. If the Court begins to use a contract
based approach, then any grand unification of tort and contract becomes
less pressing.
107. This issue is being worked through by the Supreme Court. In Rainbow Industrial
Caterers Ltd. v. Canadian National Railway Co., [ 1991] 3 S.C.R. 3 the majority approved a
calculation of damages in a tort action for negligent misrepresentation inducing a contract
which was higher than would have resulted from an action for breach of contract: the plaintiff
had apparently entered into a bad bargain, but this was not considered in calculating tort
damages to put the plaintiff back in the position it would have been in had the contract not been
entered into. But subsequently, in B.G. Checo, supra note 13 the majority noted that "in
situations of concurrent liability in tort and contract, however, it would seem anomalous to
award a different level of damages for what is essentially the same wrong on the basis of the
form of action chosen, though, of course, particular circumstances or policy may dictate such
a course" (at 38). The Court in Checo found on the facts that Checo would have entered into
the contract in any event, but at a higher price, thus minimizing the difference between the tort
and contract measures, and further remarks on "a tendency towards similar damages in tort and
contract can be identified even in Rainbow situations" (at 40). However, the Court indicated
that the higher price would not simply reflect the cost of doing the work, but also a markup for
profit. (Damages were assessed accordingly when remitted to the trial judge: (1994), 109
D.L.R. (4th) 1.) This markup would presumably not be included in a contract claim in which
Checo would simply be reimbursed for the extra expense incurred by Hydro's breach of
contract. Thus a wedge between the tort and contract measure of damages was reintroduced and
the tort standard was applied.
108. Supra note 9.
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Conclusion
Bounded rationality in risk assessment by purchasers is a valid concern
and justifies the Court's intuition in Bird Construction that liability for
defective structures should be imposed on builders. However, I have
argued that this liability should be imposed through a third-party benefi-
ciary warranty implied in contract rather than through tort liability.
Doctrinally, modifying contract law to allow for such implied warranties
is no more drastic than modifying tort law to allow expanded recovery for
pure economic loss. In London Drugs the Court insisted that any third-
party beneficiary warranty be based on the intent of the parties, thus
evidencing a concern for the autonomy of the contracting parties. I share
entirely this concern for freedom of contract, and I have argued that it is
much better served by an implied warranty which the parties are then free
to vary rather than tort liability which is beyond the parties' control. The
autonomy of the parties is not interfered with any less if the judicial
intervention is labelled "tort" rather than "contract". A third-party ben-
eficiary warranty approach to extended liability for defective structures
is thus more respectful of the autonomy of the parties than is tort law, even
if the warranty is judicially implied. I have argued that it would be ironic
if a doctrine intended to respect party autonomy was seen to preclude an
autonomy enhancing approach to extended liability for economic loss.
Functionally, imposing liability in contract allows the parties to fine
tune the risk allocation more easily than can be done if liability is initially
imposed in tort, since any modifications to the implied warranty agreed
to by the initial purchaser would be binding on the subsequent purchaser.
The initial purchaser can be counted on to serve the interest of the
subsequent purchaser for purely selfish reasons: if she is not contemplat-
ing the possibility of later selling the structure, she will negotiate the best
possible warranty for herself, and if she is contemplating selling, the
purchaser will want a good warranty as this will raise the resale price. The
subsequent purchaser is therefore as well protected through contract as
through tort. The real issue is whether the initial purchaser can be counted
on to adequately protect herself through contract. This means that the
choice between imposing liability in contract or tort depends on whether
the courts or the parties are best able to allocate the risk in question.
While it is true that the purchaser is not likely to make an optimal
decision because of bounded rationality, the court also suffers from
bounded rationality. In the abstract we cannot say whether the court's
allocation of risk will be superior to that which was arrived at by the
parties, particularly since the vendor has significant incentives to offer a
good warranty. A detailed cost-benefit examination of the warranty
offered by the New Home Warranty Corporations shows that it is not
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obviously inferior to protection which would be offered by tort law.
Further, warranty provisions can and do evolve as the parties obtain more
information.
Detailed examination of the contract provisions also lead to observa-
tions of broader interest. In particular, the concern for indeterminacy in
recovery of pure economic loss is misleading. La Forest J.'s observation
in Norsk that indeterminacy is important because of its effect on insurance
premiums was very helpful in focusing the debate, but insurance theory
indicates that increasing the variability of claims is unlikely to have a
significant impact on insurance premiums in the long run. 109 Rather, it is
indeterminacy resulting from uncertainty in the law and from transitional
problems as the law changes, which may lead to significant problems in
the insurance market. Further, indeterminacy is not the only factor
determining the cost of insurance. Allowing expanded recovery for pure
economic loss may well lead to higher insurance premiums because of
increased transaction costs. Transaction cost issues deserve to be placed
at the centre of the inquiry.
In particular, when transaction costs are considered, we can see
considerable merit in the combination of strict liability with a strictly
limited claims period, as opposed to the tort regime of negligence and a
limitations period based on reasonable discoverability. While a strict cut-
off for claims may lead to unfairness in some instances, it should
significantly reduce transaction costs and consequently price as com-
pared to the reasonable discoverability rule, and even a well informed
purchaser might prefer the strict cut-off in return for a lower price. Which
regime is to be preferred depends on the length of the strict claims period
and the distribution of discoverability of defects over time. If most claims
are likely to appear within the limitation period, then a strict cut-off is
likely to be desirable. While the available evidence indicates that the strict
five year limitation period in place in most New Home Warranty periods
may be too short, the warranties are evolving towards a longer limitation
period as more information becomes available.
In summary, the providers of the warranty have more information than
the courts and just as much incentive to provide a good warranty, and the
protection actually provided embodies trade-offs between cost and scope
of protection which appear to be well founded. Thus we can conclude that
the warranty offered by the Warranty Programs is at least as good and
probably better than that which tort law would provide. If this is the case,
expanding builder's liability in tort would make purchasers who are
109. Although it maybe significant in specialized insurance markets in smaller jurisdictions.
304 The Dalhousie Law Journal
already covered by the Warranty Programs worse off. Gains to other
groups are ambiguous at best. Therefore, expanded liability in tort is not
desirable. However, expanded liability through an implied third-party
beneficiary warranty of fitness for habitation would not adversely affect
any group of purchasers and would make some types of purchasers better
off by improving their information. 10 Expanded liability in contract is
therefore to be preferred over tort liability.
Refusing to further extend liability for pure economic loss in tort
maintains the distinction between allowing recovery of consequential
economic loss while refusing recovery for pure economic loss. This
distinction is evidently illogical when we compare cases where the nature
of the economic loss is the same and the difference stems from the
fortuitous fact of the absence of physical harm. I have argued that the
distinction is indeed illogical, but from a policy perspective the error is
in allowing recovery of consequential economic loss, not in denying
recovery of pure economic loss. It is better to maintain an illogical
distinction than to compound the error by extending tort recovery for pure
economic loss.
Because the Warranty Programs already cover those parties whose
contracting would be most likely to benefit from placing liability on the
builder, even the gains from an implied warranty of fitness for habitation
may be relatively small. But this leads to what is perhaps the most
interesting issue raised in this article. We have seen that the establishment
of the Warranty Programs was subject to significant collective action
problems: the costs of setting up the program would be borne by a
relatively small group who took the initiative, but the program would
necessarily cover all builders in order to establish a sufficiently large risk
pool. So long as any benefits from offering a warranty would accrue to the
purchaser rather than to the builder, no builder would have a sufficient
individual incentive to set up a warranty program. However, if the default
rule had placed liability on the builder, the builder's incentives to create
the warranty program would have been much stronger. I suggest that had
the courts implied a warranty of fitness for habitation before the 1970s,
we would have seen warranty programs set up on the initiative of the
builders rather than on the initiative of the government. Thus the nature
of the liability regime can be important in influencing the development
of risk reducing institutions.
110. This echoes Calabresi's third guideline for deciding where liability should initially be
placed, which, as he puts it in The Costs ofAccidents, supra n.9 at 150, "is to allocate accident
costs in such a way as to maximize the likelihood that errors in allocation will be corrected in
the market."
The Choice Between Implied Warranty and Tort Liability
I have argued that in deciding whether tort or contractual liability is
preferable, a comparative institutional analysis is needed, which com-
pares the strengths and weaknesses of the market and judicial responses.
A thorough analysis of this sort depends on the particular institutional and
psychological details of the market for the goods in question and so
conclusions cannot easily be generalized. But the market for new home
warranties does show that despite very significant problems of bounded
rationality and lack of competition, the market response to the problem
of building defects has been reasonably good. This at least provides some
reason for optimism in other contexts. Further, an implied warranty
approach allows greater judicial precision in responding to specific
problems. In a tort approach the court must structure all aspects of the
relationship, regardless of whether the market response is adequate or
even preferable on a given point. Under an implied warranty approach the
court can impose more stringent conditions on particular types of terms,
for instance by systematically holding certain types of terms to be
unconscionable. In other words, using tort law the court has to regulate
categories of relationship, but using contract law it can regulate catego-
ries of contractual terms. For these reasons I suggest that greater reliance
on contractual solutions may generally be advisable, and should certainly
always be considered.
